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WOMEN AND THE FAMILY: AN EXAMINATION
OF FALSE UNIVERSALITY
Hegel’s consideration of the family begins in the 
third part of the Philosophy of Right which is concerned 
with Ethical Life. In the Hegelian analysis of Right, 
of the development of the Idea of freedom as the embodiment 
of the free will, ethical life is "the unity of the will in 
its concept with the will of the individual."^ Hegel terms 
ethical life the "truth" of the two abstract moments, For­
mal Right and Morality insofar as formal right is the will 
in its immediacy and its embodiment in an immediate external 
thing, while Morality is the will reflected from this ex­
ternal embodiment into itself. In synthesizing these two 
moments. Ethical Life is the stage of development of the 
Idea of the absolutely free will in which the good is not 
only conceptual, but is also realized both in the will re­
flected into itself and in the external world, resulting in 
the existence of freedom as substance, actuality, and as 
necessity. Thus, Ethical Life is ". . . the Idea in its 
absolutely universal existence." Ethical substance how­
ever is similarly dialectical, involving three significant 
moments which are: 1) the natural mind or the Family,
2) the division and appearance of the natural mind or 
Civil Society, 3) the State as universal and objective
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freedom even in the free self-subsistence of the particular 
will. The dialectical movement of this relationship thus 
begins with the actual and organic mind of a single nation 
which reveals and actualizes itself through the interrela­
tion of the particular national minds until in the process 
of world history it reveals and actualizes itself as the 
universal world-mind whose right is supreme.
Ethical Life is the concept of freedom developed 
into the existing world as the good endowed with self- 
conscious knowing and action. It is also the nature of 
self-consciousness insofar as the ethical realm is the
3absolute foundation and ultimate end of self-consciousness. 
This is not to say, however, that the ethical order is 
purely transcendent, for it is a substance which rises to 
self-consciousness in individuals and is actualized only for 
that reason. As the unity of the concept of the will with 
the particular will, the Ethical Attitude presents an 
objective/subjective distinction, but it is one in which 
the subjective and objective elements so modify one another 
as to constitute two syntheses of object and subject, each 
of which is the totality of the Idea.
The first "totality" is ethical life regarded ob­
jectively. Its form is subjective which is to say that its 
substance is made concrete by subjectivity as infinite form. 
The State and its institutions (as ideal) exemplify the ob­
jectivity of ethical life but the legitimizing force of those
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institutions depends upon the self-consciousness of the citi­
zens. The other two stages of ethical life, viz. the family 
and civil society, also constitute a substantiality in 
Hegelian terms to the extent that each has subsistence in 
itself. In this sense, the family is a substance of which 
its members are accidents, although the substantiality is 
not external or visible. Instead the family's substance is 
its bond of love. In Hegel's view this love is reason in 
its immediacy, i.e., it is an immature form of reason.
There is no explicit difference between substance and acci­
dent in the family for the family's focus is on its unity 
rather than on its differences. In the next stage, civil 
society, difference becomes explicit and the substance appears 
in the particulars. In this stage the individuals have risen 
above love to intelligence but it is concentrated on a pri­
vate end. The third stage is then the synthesis of the first 
two or the particularization of the substantial mind of the 
nation into rational laws and institutions. Regarded ob­
jectively, the ethical order is thus a circle of necessity 
whose moments are the ethical powers regulating the life of 
the individual and culminating in the political situation 
in which what the state's compulsive power exacts, the indi­
vidual also wills.
The second synthesis of the Ethical Attitude, i.e., 
of the unity of the concept of the will with the particular 
will, is the subjective view of ethical life. Here the
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ethical will of the individual is aware of objective duties 
as the means by which one actualizes his own inner univer­
sality. This ethical substance and its laws stand over 
against the subject in one sense, having an absolute authority 
and power. At the same time these powers are not alien to 
the subject for they are directly linked to him by a relation 
in which the ethical order is the actual soul of self- 
consciousness.
Hegel argues that the laws and institutions of the 
Ethical Order are binding on the will of the individual be­
cause he distinguishes himself from them as subjective and 
therefore stands related to them as the substance of his own 
being. Furthermore, the individual finds his liberation in 
duty, first, from dependence on mere natural impulse and from 
the depression which as a particular subject he cannot escape 
in his moral reflection on what ought to be and what might be, 
and second, from the indeterminate subjectivity which remains 
self-enclosed and devoid of actuality. Thus Hegel argues 
that the individual acquires his substantive freedom in duty.
Hegel goes on to suggest that the substance of mind 
exists for the first time as mind when the habitual practice 
of ethical living appears as a second nature which is the 
soul of custom permeating the natural will. With this de­
velopment the substantial Ethical Order attains its right 
and the validity of its right insofar as the self-will of 
the individual as opposed to ethical substance vanishes.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
When his character is ethical, Hegel understands the individ­
ual as recognizing the universal as the end which moves him 
to act. Further, this individual knows that his dignity and 
the whole stability of his particular ends are grounded in 
this same universal. Thus subjectivity becomes itself the 
absolute form and existent actuality of the substantial 
order, and the distinction between the subject and the sub­
stance (i.e., the object or end of the subject) vanishes in 
the same way as the formal distinction between the individ­
ual's will and the ethical substance.
In belonging to an actual ethical order, the individual 
is guaranteed two rights, the first that of being subjectively 
destined to freedom, and the second the right to particular 
satisfaction. The first right of one's subjective destiny 
issues from the individual's conviction that his freedom 
realizes its truth in the Objective order and in the fact that 
an individual is actually in possession of his own essence or 
inner universality when he is a member of an ethical order.
The second right to particular satisfaction is contained in 
the ethical substantial order since particularity is the out­
ward appearance of that order. Thus Hegel suggests that right 
and duty coalesce in the identity of the universal will with 
the particular will. Further, a man who is part of an ethical 
order has rights insofar as he has duties and duties insofar 
as he has rights, which moves beyond the sphere of abstract 
right where I have a right and someone else has a corresponding
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duty, as well as beyond the sphere of morality where the 
right of an individual’s private judgment and will has not, 
but only ought to have, coalesced with duties and become 
objective. This ethical substance, as the unity of indi­
vidual self-consciousness with its concept is for Hegel 
the actual mind of a family and of a nation.
The concept of this Idea, i.e., the union of self- 
consciousness and its concept, is mind as something knowing 
itself and actual. This mind then, objectifies itself in 
the movement running through the form of its moments, viz. 
universality, particularity, and individuality. The objec­
tification of each of these moments is a different form of 
organization. Thus, the ethical mind in its natural or 
immediate phase is first the Family. Thus substantiality 
loses its unity and passes into division and the phase of 
relation which is Civil Society. Civil Society is an asso­
ciation of members as self-subsistent individuals in a uni­
versality which is only abstract. Their association is 
brought about by their needs, by the legal system, and by 
an external organization for attaining their particular and 
common interests. This external state is brought back to 
and unified with the state in the Constitution of the State 
which is the end and actuality of both the substantial uni­
versal order and public life.
From this sketch it is possible to begin extracting 
the more significant aspects of both regressive and progressive
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tendencies in the Hegelian dialectic structuring the realiza­
tion of the State and true self-conscious freedom. It is 
important to identify and separate the features of each ten­
dency because the utopian idealism generated by the logic of 
Hegel's argument is critically undermined by the contradictory 
material conditions which it ignores. Nevertheless, the con­
cept of a "necessary" movement structuring the progression of 
human history toward an actualization of human freedom is far 
too rich to simply dismiss. While such a concept may indeed 
bear little resemblance to the pattern of events in either our 
private or our public lives today, and may in fact suggest 
uncomfortable associations with the brutally executed notions 
"progress," "Manifest Destiny," or various religious crusades 
which legitimized acts of oppression toward particular groups 
or towards the natural environment, the idea of historical 
progression on a rational basis articulates the concern for 
a rational and ethical society that is rapidly fading from 
the discussion and consideration of "practical" men.
It is generally agreed that the democratic society 
protects individual rights by limiting individual freedom, 
but it is difficult to generate productive discussion of the 
nature of that paradigmatic state of individuality for which 
various concepts of rights and freedom are developed. Today 
as the problems of alienation as seen in loneliness, unsat­
isfactory personal relationships, and a decreasing ability 
to engage the objective substance of one's life, become more
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acute, the meaning of individual or civil rights becomes more 
obscure. The traditional understanding of civil rights by 
means of a kind of training in the art of self’•defense, 
wherein one acknowledges the rights of others in order to 
guarantee his own, apparently cannot speak to the situation 
in which one seeks integration with rather than protection 
from the general community. Without attempting to deny the 
importance of legal protection against the selfish, or par­
ticularistic, aims of other individuals in civil society, 
the primary concern for the individual and his property seems 
at the very least to address only part of the problems with 
which people are confronted as members of a social organiza­
tion, viz. those concerning matters of contract, production, 
and private ownership. Beyond these parameters there is a 
sudden but deliberate emptiness about the concept of indi­
vidual rights which, while theoretically based on the idea 
of individual freedom and self-determination, extends its 
would-be "non-interference" into an official negation of 
public responsibility for the quality of life made possible 
by the structure of interdependence in civil society, and 
consequently for the quality or actualization of human beings 
in that society.
The idea of public responsibility for the quality of 
life in democratic civil society fairly bristles with issues 
concerning restriction and imposition upon the individual 
insofar as the notion of human commonality is understood as
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the homogenization of human variety. Thus Hegel’s percep­
tion of a political situation in which the individual wills 
what the state's compulsive power exacts might all too easily 
be shunned as the totalitarian sort of political ideal that 
must result from any idealistic, naive scheme to realize a 
unity of individual wills. Were it not for Hegel’s charac­
terization of the State as the final and ultimate moment of 
the necessary progression of rationality, i.e., or Ethical 
Life, it would in fact be difficult to separate the specific 
features of individual actualization from individual repres­
sion with respect to the concept of the state. Thus, if the 
notion of personal autonomy is defined by reference to a 
fundamental opposition or difference of particular wills, 
the suggestion of agreement between individuals seems to be 
without practical application unless arbitrarily enforced by 
an authoritarian power. But Hegel’s conception of ethical 
life rests upon the central feature of a circle of necessity 
uniting the three objective moments, universality, particu­
larity, and individuality, and in so doing casts the nature 
of the political State in terms of the individual family.
The fact that it is the family rather than the state 
which objectifies the rational "moment" of universality de­
mands first, that Hegel’s vision of a political situation 
necessitating human freedom must be understood as the inclu­
sion of the unique capacity of the family to know the indi­
vidual above and beyond his accomplishments and/or "crimes,"
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to be radically concerned about his welfare, and yet to per­
ceive his importance as no greater and no less than that of 
any other family member. While the suggestion of total 
political unity appears to threaten the real possibility of 
individuality, the family's unity, to the extent that it 
provides care, concern, and guidance, and a generally sus­
taining environment for the individual's development, is 
the source of individuality, inevitably shaping it to some 
degree in or against its own character, but fundamentally 
giving individuality life, maintenance and its essential 
context. The success of family unity can be most profitably 
assessed in terms of the freedom of the individual family 
member in his relationships and activities outside of the 
family per se insofar as the causal connection between a 
neglected or deprived child (as well as a restricted and 
unhappy parent), and a socially irresponsible or aberrant 
citizen has been established through the work of social 
scientists and researchers.
Furthermore, Hegel's circle of necessity firmly con­
nects the realization of the State with the experience of 
family unity in such a way as to demand a clear awareness 
on the part of the individual of his own dependence upon 
the source of unity for his fullest and most free being.
In this sense Hegel's dialectic reveals the centrality of 
the experience of universality to the political situation 
in which the legitimization of authority can be in fact
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traced to the individual as a free and responsible citizen. 
The emphasis on the sense of self as part of and dependent 
upon a group which peculiarly characterizes the family can­
not be overstated, for it is particularly with the family 
that such a subordination of individuality can be understood 
as essentially progressive. It is important, however, not 
to confuse the contemporary increase in family disunity and 
instability with Hegel's perception of the family as ra­
tionality realizing objective universality and thereby con­
clude that it is only the family's nominal bonds which need 
be considered essential to the state, regardless of the way 
in which the individual is integrated into this family. A 
subordination of the individual to a family (or other group) 
which does not express care for the development of the in­
dividual, but rather a neglect and disregard for the individ­
ual that is tantamount to a denial of individual being, 
implies a concept of the family that has little to do with 
Hegel's ideal realization of freedom except as a point of 
critique. To confront the contemporary charges of domina­
tion and repression of individuality with respect to the 
family is to raise the question of control, now not only 
as it affects and divides family members, but also as it 
negates and falsifies the authority of the State.
Because Hegel does not distinguish between oppressive 
features of family life and those necessary to its substan­
tiality, it is important to exclude those philosophic
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arguments which overlook a regressive material manifestation 
from an overall appreciation of the movement from family to 
State. The issue of control is perhaps the question requir­
ing the most immediate attention in a review of Hegel’s 
treatment of Ethical Life insofar as the problem of domina­
tion within a family setting grounds the question of women's 
rights and by and large defines the questions of family ef­
fectiveness in contemporary society, as well as those experi­
ences of estrangement and antagonism toward the family on the 
part of many individuals today. While it would be foolhardy 
to attempt to "answer" these questions, particularly given 
the conditions of democratic society, an analysis and critique 
of the Hegelian dialectic can open the question of how and 
why the family, as the primary moment of universality in most 
individuals’ experience, loses its capacity to instill in its 
members a responsiveness and appreciation for what is basically 
the brotherhood of all men. The significance of this question, 
however, radically exceeds the level of "family counseling" 
insofar as its dimensions include, in the manner of Hegel's 
circle of necessity, the nature of the state and the legiti­
mization of its authority.
In his essay, "A Study on Authority," H. Marcuse 
analyzes Hegel's construction of the state out of the will 
of individuals as a sketch of the development of authori­
tarian consciousness. He suggests that Hegel's ultimate 
goal of the free subordination of the individual will to
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the general will of state requires a deliberate fostering of 
a state-upholding sentiment in the psyche of the individual 
for which the institutions of the state in their finished 
form are not adequate. The preparation for a voluntary 
recognition of, and subordination to, the state's authority 
must therefore begin much farther back in the history of the 
individual, viz. through the situation of the "corporations" 
of civil society to the family. The Corporations in Hegel's 
notion of civil society are the second ethical root of the 
state, and enable the individual to achieve civil recognition 
within the general community on the basis of his own recogni­
tion of the universality of that community's institutions.
The family however, as the prior and more basic ethical root, 
brings out characteristics in the individual which enables 
him to become a part of the state which represents "objec­
tive" morality.^
The case was previously made for the importance of 
those characteristics, for which the family is the primary 
source, that generally develop a consciousness of linkage 
between individuals based not on the calculated realization 
of selfish aims, but rather on the realization that authentic 
free individuality must emerge from universality. By turning 
to the question of authoritarian consciousness, Marcuse 
focuses on the problematic character of that "universality" 
in its practical as opposed to theoretical development, first, 
by means of family organization, and later, by acknowledgment
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of the state's legislative authority. The necessity of or­
ganizational authority in either case does not present the 
significant conflict with which Marcuse is concerned, but 
rather the relationship between servitude and domination 
which generally defines family organization and which con­
tributes to the construction of an authoritative socio­
political order. Much of his critique refers to Hegel's 
Phenomenology of Mind, but he also quotes from Hegel's 
System of Morality where the family is referred to as the 
"external openly manifested element of the relationship 
between domination and servitude in its indifference,"^
For Hegel human existence is primarily self- 
consciousness, but self-consciousness is only 'in and for 
iself' when it is in and for itself through another.
Marcuse observes, however, that this kind of recognition 
by another occurs for Hegel after a "life and death struggle 
in the realm of appropriation and property, work and service, 
fear and discipline." The domination of the master consists 
of greed for the enjoyment of things, appropriation as the 
sensuous acquisition of property, and the binding of the sub­
ordinated person through the 'work' which is forced upon him. 
In contrast, the servitude of the servant consists in his 
material powerlessness, his absolute fear of the master, his 
constant 'discipline' of service and most importantly in his 
being chained to his work which makes him dependent on things, 
and consequently on the master who owns them. Marcuse notes
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here that Hegel's decisive insight is that domination and 
servitude only become possible through a particular form of 
the labor process.
Hegel goes on to argue that domination can only be­
come real as a recognized power over the realm in which 
things are at its disposal through the labor performed in 
servitude, so that "the truth of independent consciousness 
is thus the consciousness of the bondsman."^ Hegel's ex­
planation of this is that the features of the most extreme 
powerlessness and dependence, viz. Fear and Service (dis­
cipline and obedience) are the very forces that drive servi­
tude out of its state of dependence by forcing the servant 
on pain of fear of the master, into the labor process where 
his real power will reveal itself and where he will come 
'to himself. Thus it is ultimately the serving-consciousness 
which has acquired its true form in the labor-process that is 
the real point of transition in the supercession of the 
domination-servitude relationship. From this Marcuse con­
cludes that it is not absolute reason but absolute force that 
stands at the beginning of the 'objective spirit'.
With this conclusion Marcuse opens the fundamental 
dynamic of the Hegelian dialectic, viz. the force of reason 
advancing through its moments of objectification to its full 
realization, to the critical objections of those for whom the 
process of acquiring self-consciousness is easily confused 
with the process of providing the material basis for another's
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physical, immediate comfort. In this sense Hegel^s percep­
tion of the theoretical "forces" driving servitude out of 
its state of dependence grievously ignores the violent and 
repressive nature of the actively dominating force, as well 
as its implications for a political system requiring such a 
relationship at its root. While Hegel's perception of the 
human need for objectification in the real or natural world 
is grounded in the phenomenological process of self- 
realization by means of an engagement with the world in 
which one lives, the notion of the need for a dominating 
force introduces elements of inequality and disparity be­
tween individuals that give a logical basis to the exploita­
tion of one individual's labor power by another. Thus the 
theoretical perception of a realizing of self-consciousness 
overlooks the extent to which an individual's labor can 
either be prevented from, or perverted in, objectifying 
individual being when the production process, as well as 
the product, are alienated from the laborer.
In his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, 
Marx considers Hegel's treatment of the essence of man as 
self-consciousness from the point of view of the individual 
who leads an alienated life. Working within Hegel's 
phenomenological analysis of the estrangement of human 
essence, or the alienation of self-consciousness natural 
to an active, living being, Marx focuses on the manner of 
reappropriation of the "objective essence of man" in which
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the moment of alienation experienced by selfTConsciousness 
is annulled or superceded, allowing consciousness to re­
unify itself. Marx argues that Hegel is merely concerned 
with annulling the objective character of the object insofar 
as consciousness, or reason, knows itself only by means of 
the process of externalization or estrangement of self- 
consciousness. Thus, Hegel finds the rational perception 
of the essential dependence of the self upon its various 
forms of objectification so binding upon the being of self- 
consciousness as to make the character of the estranged 
externalized consciousness inconsequential. In practical, 
everyday terms this is as much as to say that a critical 
approach to the material conditions of one's life is without 
practical obligation to change or in some way affect them, 
for the nature of being is such that its identity is, in 
the first place, dependent upon the conditions in which it 
finds itself reflected, and is in the second place, beyond 
the realm of those material conditions which only accidentally 
impose upon it. For Marx, the implication that self-conscious 
man can recognize, annul and supercede the spiritual world as 
self-alienation and yet confirm it in its alienated shape as 
his true mode of being is the root of Hegel's "false posi­
tivism." Calling this an attempt to put "reason at home in 
unreason as unreason," Marx objects to the implication that 
self-affirmation in contradiction with itself can yet be true 
knowledge and life. Instead he argues that if one knows
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religion as alienated human self-consciousness, for example, 
then one realizes himself in annihilated and superceded
Oreligion, not in religion itself.
In his critique Marx is particularly concerned with 
Hegel's act of compliance toward religion, the state, and 
its institutions insofar as Hegel's analysis of the dialectic 
between the rational individual and his world leaves the in­
dividual necessarily engaged with the reification of his 
alienated self-consciousness. For Marcuse, who approaches 
this process with an eye towards labor and production, the 
contradiction of "reason at home in unreason as unreason" 
negates the motive force of reason insofar as the movement 
of one's reappropriation of his objectivity is brought to 
a halt with the coexistence of the rational and the irra­
tional. In terms of the dialectic between the family, 
civil society and the state, Hegel's compromise of reason 
at the point of one's recognition that what is the objecti­
fication of the self is in fact alienated self-consciousness 
implies that the individual's growth and development toward 
his freedom or necessary and full rationality is of secon­
dary importance to his capacity to conform to the demands 
of a political and social situation that gives his particu­
lar identity form by opposing it.
To the extent that Hegel can be understood as con­
cerned for the support and maintenance of the status quo, 
the family's universality thus begins to appear as quite a
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bit less than the primary experience of the integration of 
the self into a group or community by means of caring, re­
sponsive and emotional bonds between human beings. Instead, 
the family experience appears as the primary experience of 
the self as circumscribed and restricted by a group on which 
it is radically dependent despite the impossibility of a 
holistic synthesis between the self as alienated and particu­
lar and his identity as family member. The specific split in 
self-consciousness facilitated by Hegel's acceptance of the 
"confirmation . . .  of the self-estranged essence in its de-
gniai," is therefore the rational origin of the split be­
tween an individual’s identity in self-consciousness and 
reason, and his identity as a member of a productive unit.
For men and women employed as wage labor, this personal 
fragmentation is most readily apparent as a feature of civil 
society and their activities in that sphere. For women, it 
is also a feature of family life negating not only the woman’s 
experience of primary universality, but also the substantiality 
of familial unity at all insofar as the disparity between a 
woman's service to her family and that of the other family 
members to the family and the woman reduces her objective 
being in accordance with her presence as wife, mother, house­
keeper, etc.
Marx's critique strikes at the rupture in Hegel's 
phenomenological dialectic as a point of logical breakdown 
that permits a philosophical justification of actual servitude.
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With respect to the situation of women in the family, this 
rupture can be seen as the source of a more profound and 
socially far-reaching manifestation of the development of 
an authoritarian consciousness than the strictly logical 
criticism implies. To some extent it is the fact that the 
family does provide the historical source of the average 
individual's understanding of political organization that 
most critically demands the publicizing and analysis of 
the woman's "role" in the family insofar as what Hegel took 
to be the fundamental, ethical experience of universality 
must be acknowledged as flawed. In this sense it would ap­
pear at best naive to campaign, particularly at the risk of 
one's life, for the "ideal" society when the most elemental 
model of human unity and organization as based on bonds of 
human empathy and respect is itself the embodiment of nega­
tion, abuse, exploitation, and alienated consciousness.
If women can merely aspire to a rational negation of 
the role(s) provided for their participation and integration 
into the family as it is structured today it is doubtful 
that any real progress can be made by means of their new 
awareness. To the extent that the family remains a facade 
of unity that finds justification for the relationships of 
servitude and therefore domination on which it depends, the 
primary experience of all future individuals will be just as 
characterized by inequality and exploitation between human 
beings as it was before the idea of women's oppression
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vis-a-vis the family caught public attention. In short, the 
simple condemnation of an enforced role such as that of wife 
and mother cannot compensate for the manifestations of self- 
abnegation which issue from the acceptance and use of alien­
ated self-consciousness. It is not enough for women to 
recognize the extent to which their own development as an 
individual is stunted by the demands made upon them in the 
name of the experience of universality, for not only do they 
risk a daily decrease in their realization of "being-for- 
itself," i.e., their truly human potential, but they simul­
taneously contribute to the notion of a socially unavoidable 
level of exploitation by permitting and participating in an 
experience of false universality on which society as a whole 
depends for a reference in the construction of a rational 
society and State.
The problem at hand might therefore be defined as: 
how to liberate women from their restrictive and alienating 
roles as made necessary by the family without destroying the 
family in the process, with the most critical issue in terms 
of the current women’s movement being whether or not there 
is really any progress made towards equal opportunity for a 
woman’s realization of individuality if her social (in the 
sense of human) obligations are defined in terms of her 
relation to the family and child-rearing, and if her own 
development is contingent upon this definition. In this 
sense, it is important to confront the sexual division of
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labor which seems to place the onus of social responsibility 
as squarely on the woman’s shoulders in a revolutionary 
society as it does in bourgeois society; for if a woman must 
always define her individuality, i.e., self, in the face of 
the family’s, and by extension other individuals', demands 
it is certain that any future revolutionary society will be 
as flawed by the dynamics of a domination-servitude relation­
ship as any previously known. At the same time, the signifi­
cance of feminity as it is used as a symbol for all of the 
features of a human relationship that are out of place in the 
routine activities of civil society must not be lost to the 
urgency of recouping women’s historical "losses." Whether or 
not individual women can identify with the qualities of car­
ing, warmth, emotional response, and noncalculative use of 
other human beings, it is hardly the legitimate aim of a 
revolutionary society to eliminate these aspects of human 
being, typically associated with femininity though they are, 
from the human spirit. Thus, it again becomes essential to 
recognize the extent to which a nominal rectification of the 
woman’s role in the family is, e.g., by means of greater 
opportunities for integration into civil society, does not 
in fact contribute to the construction of a society in which 
genuine freedom, i.e., individuality, is a real possibility. 
Although the exclusion of women from various pursuits and 
activities in civil society certainly typifies the way in 
which women are prevented from experiencing the essential
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externalization and objectification requisite to individual 
development, the dialectical relation between the family and 
civil society assures the eclipse of those very opportunities 
not only for women, but for most men as well, if the experi­
ence of universality in the family is not firmly established 
in the consciousness of the young, "pre-individuals."
Perhaps the most common and most frequent charge 
against any feminist movement is that of accusing the individ­
ual woman of neglecting her family out of her own egoistic con­
cerns. It is primarily as a question of time and attention 
to "duty" that a woman finds herself faced with a choice be­
tween life as a member of the family and life as a member of 
civil society insofar as the family in bourgeois society 
cannot accommodate the woman who realizes and resents or re­
fuses the limitations of a life confined to the parameters of 
the home. While the most binding imperatives, viz., those 
that are economic, for a woman’s total absorption into her 
family differ widely from class to class, the criticism of 
her attempts to break this bondage as just offered on the 
basis of the needs of the family distinctly echoes the long 
history of conservative reaction to the women’s movement. 
Indeed, it would appear that the notion of a universal 
feminine obligation to not only undertake motherhood, but 
to also devote a significant part of one’s life as a woman 
to it, is so pervasive that even a revolutionary dream of 
the better or "ideal" society must return to the solid
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material base of conscientious and ethical mothers who will 
provide the reproductive source of the future citizenry.
But the woman of today must object to this kind of cate­
gorization of themselves as the reproductive organs of 
mankind first, on the grounds of their own being as con­
sciousness and Hegel's sense of reason which, when denied 
free movement toward the as yet unrealized point of full 
development, stands as the negation of human freedom. They 
must also object out of a concern for the same historical 
progression that inspires all revolutionary consciousness 
nsofar as any avoidable acquiescence to conditions imposed 
oy the status quo interferes with that progression either 
directly or indirectly.
In his Introduction to the Critique of the Philosophy 
of Right, Marx accuses German philosophy of being the ideal 
prolongation of German history insofar as he finds Germans 
to be living their "post-history" in thought or in philoso­
phy.^® "In politics," he says, "the Germans have thought 
what other nations did,"^^ acting in effect as their 
theoretical consciousness. Marx regards Hegel's criticism 
of the German philosophy of right and of the state as both 
a critical analysis of the modern state and the definitive 
negation of all the past forms of consciousness in German 
jurisprudence and politics, but notes the contradiction in 
the fact that while Germany can produce this speculative 
philosophy of right, the German representative of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
25
m o d e m  state which leaves the real man out of account is 
only possible because the modern state itself leaves the 
real man out of account.
Similarly, the speculative sort of criticism of 
the woman's role in the family today cannot of itself trans­
form the woman's place in the family despite the public 
appearance of women in more of the activities and business 
of civil society. Marx goes on to say that the criticism 
of speculative philosophy of right suggests tasks that can 
only be solved by means of practical activity, which is to
say that theoretical needs must become immediate practical 
12needs. In this sense, the theoretical needs of humanity 
vis-a-vis universality must be realized through the material 
imperatives of practical situations, the most immediate of 
which, with respect to the family, is the woman's release or 
liberation from the serving mentality of the individual to 
whom all responsibility for the mundane activities of caring 
for, sustaining and maintaining a family group devolve.
Hegel's analysis of the family as the ethical root of the 
state is valuable as an articulation of the centrality of 
the woman's relationship within the family to the wider situa­
tions of society and the individual, but as philosophy it can 
only be realized by the abolition of those conditions which 
lock a woman into the roles of the maker of babies and homes 
at the expense of her own progress toward individuality.
At this point it would seem profitable to return to
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Hegel’s treatment of the family in the Philosophy of Right 
in order to begin making the distinctions between the aspects 
of the family that are necessary to the State in terms of 
Hegel's concept of the actualization of freedom, and those 
features which derive from the ideological foundations of 
particular interests.
As the immediate substantiality of mind, Hegel finds 
the family specifically characterized by love, which he says 
is the mind's feeling of its own unity. Thus, in a family 
the individual is conscious of himself as a member rather 
than an independent person. The right which an individual 
enjoys on the strength of family unity, that is the indi­
vidual’s life within this unity, takes on the form of right 
only when the family begins to dissolve. At that time, the 
family members begin to be self-subsistent persons and re­
ceive their ’share’ separately by way of money, food, edu­
cational expenses, etc. The family is completed in three 
phases: 1) Marriage, or the form assumed by the concept of
the family in its immediate phase, 2 ) Family Property and 
Capital (the external embodiment of the concept), 3) The 
Education of the Children and Dissolution of the Family.
As the immediate type of ethical relationship, 
marriage is first of all the moment of physical life, but 
through the self-consciousness of marriage, the natural 
sexual union is changed from a merely inward union to a 
union on the level of mind, i.e., into self-conscious love.
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Hegel argues that marriage is in essence an ethical tie.
Thus when it is treated only as a sexual relationship mar­
riage is stripped of its other characteristics. Similarly 
when marriage is thought of as only a civil contract, it is 
degraded to the level of a contract for reciprocal use. And 
if marriage is based on love alone it is exposed to every 
contingency because love is a feeling, and therefore does not 
qualify as ethical life. Marriage therefore is more precisely 
characterized as ethico-legal love and does not include the 
transient, fickle, and purely subjective aspects of love.
Hegel does allow that marriage may have a more obvious sub­
jective source in the particular inclinations of two persons, 
but the objective source nevertheless lies in the free con­
sent of the persons to renounce their natural and individual 
personality to this unity of one with another. In this sense 
marriage is their liberation, he says, because in it they 
attain their substantive self-consciousness. Hegel goes on 
to say that our objectively appointed end and therefore our 
ethical duty is to enter the "married state," and while the 
external origin of any particular marriage is fundamentally 
contingent, it mainly depends on the extent to which reflec­
tive thought has been developed.
Hegel finds the ethical aspect of marriage specifically 
in the individual's consciousness of this unity as their sub­
stantive aim, and therefore consisting of their love, trust, 
and common sharing of their entire existence as individuals.
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While it begins with a contract, it is peculiarly a contract 
to transcend the standpoint of contract from which people 
view one another in their individuality as self-subsistent 
units. Furthermore, the identification of personalities 
whereby the family becomes one person and its members become 
its accidents is the ethical mind, which when considered in 
itself apart from a particular circumstance is the ground of 
the religious character of marriage and the family.
Hegel is careful to point out that no one facet of 
marriage makes up the whole range of its ethical character. 
Thus if the wedding ceremony is taken as only an external 
formality it is stripped of all significance except as a 
civil relation reduced to a mere fiat of civil or ecclesi­
astical authority. As such, the ceremony would appear as 
something not merely indifferent to the true nature of mar­
riage, but actually alien to it. If marriage is understood 
as merely a formal condition which must precede the complete 
mutual surrender of the parties to one another, it appears to 
"bring disunion into their loving disposition, and like an
1 7alien intruder, to thwart the inwardness of their union." 
Thus, again: the specifically ethical character of marriage 
consists in the fact that the consciousness of the parties is 
crystallized out of its physical and subjective mode, and is 
lifted to the thought of what is substantive.
Hegel does characterize the difference between men 
and women as similar to that between animals and plants.
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saying that women are capable of education but are not "made” 
for activities demanding a universal faculty such as the more 
advanced sciences, philosophy, and certain forms of artistic 
production. One sex he says is mind, the self-consciousness 
of conceptual thought and the volition of the final objective 
end, while the other is mind maintaining itself in unity as 
knowledge and volition of the substantive, but knowledge and 
volition in the form of concrete individuality and feeling.
Finally he says that marriage is essentially monogamy 
because it is personality, i.e., immediate exclusive indi­
viduality, which enters into this tie, and therefore the 
truth of this tie can only proceed from the mutual whole­
hearted surrender of this personality. Personality then, 
only attains its right of being conscious of itself in 
another to the extent that the other is in this identical 
relationship as a person. Marriage, and especially monogamy, 
is therefore one of the absolute principles on which the 
ethical life of the community depends.
However, the family as person (atomic individual) 
has its real external existence in property; and it is only 
when this property takes the form of capital that it becomes 
the embodiment of the substantial personality of the family, 
Hegel argues that as a universal and enduring person, the 
family requires possessions that are specifically determined 
as permanent and secure, which is to say it requires capital. 
In contrast to the arbitrariness of a single owner's
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particular needs as one abstract moment of property, par­
ticular need as well as the selfishness of desire is trans­
formed in family property into something ethical, into 
labor and care for a common possession. This capital is 
common property, and while no member of the family has 
property of his own, each has his right in the common stock. 
But this right may come into conflict with the father’s 
right of administration because the family is exposed to 
partition and contingency. Finally, property is connected 
essentially to the conjugal relation, and only remotely to 
the clan or house, for marriage creates a new family inde­
pendent of clans or houses,
Hegel regards the children of the family as the only 
external and objective existence of the unity of marriage. 
The children have the right to maintenance and education at 
the expense of the family’s common capital, and the rights 
of the parents over the wishes of their children is limited 
by the object, viz. discipline and education. The punish­
ment of children is not specifically concerned with justice, 
but rather with preventing the children from exercising 
freedom while still in the toils of nature and with lifting 
the universal into their consciousness. Similarly, the 
child's education has the positive aim of instilling ethical 
principles into the child in the form of an immediate feel­
ing in which differences are not yet explicit, and the nega­
tive aim of raising children out of the instinctive physical
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level to self-subsistence and freedom of personality, and so 
to the level at which they have the power to leave the natu­
ral unity.
Once the children have been educated to freedom of 
personality and are capable of holding free property and of 
founding families of their own, the original family moves 
into its time of ethical dissolution and the question of 
inheritance must be dealt with. The essence of inheritance 
in Hegel's view is the transfer of property which is in 
principle common to private ownership. This transfer becomes 
increasingly confused as the sense of family unity fades.
The particular danger in Hegel's view at the time of dissolu­
tion, either through the father's death or when persons and 
families have become so dispersed through civil society as 
to have begun to gain self-subsistence, is that a man may 
squander his capital or bequeath it to someone outside the 
family. To the extent that the family's capital is an em­
bodiment of the family unity however, Hegel regards bequests 
to friends as ethically justified only when the friendship 
was so close as to approximate the family relationship.
Finally, Hegel suggests that the family disintegrates 
essentially and through nature. In this sense the moments 
bound together in the family's unity must be released from 
the concept of the ethical idea to self-subsistent objective 
reality. This then is the stage of difference, or the deter­
mination of particularity which is related to universality
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but in such a way that universality is its basic principle 
though only inward. The transition from the family to civil 
society is the emergence of the particular; the leaving 
behind of an undifferentiated universality and the arrival 
at the realm of appearance.
Marcuse lists three features of the Hegelian concept 
of the family that particularly qualify it for guiding the 
individual's development from subjective particularity to 
objective universality, i.e., Hegel's sense of authentic 
freedom: 1) It is a direct unification of individuals into 
a general community without the person as such being negated. 
2) Its real character of general community is constantly in 
the individual's awareness. 3) Since the actual communal 
nature of needs and interests concern an actual universality 
(if limited) they are raised from the sphere of mere selfish­
ness and are 'moralized'.
Taken by themselves , these aspects of the family 
emphasize the development of a collective or social conscious 
ness in the individual that also integrates the notion of 
responsibility to, and freedom in the full scope of humanity. 
But Marcuse points out that all of these features are only 
realized in the specific relationship between family and 
property, which is the central focus of all features of the 
Hegelian family. Hegel's concept of the individual as an 
existing person is basically that he is a private owner, and 
Marcuse quotes Hegel in the Enzyklopadie, the "person only
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becomes merged with himself in property, and only possesses 
the ’external sphere of his freedom’ in property.
But even if property is the first embodiment of 
freedom, and therefore is a substantive end, Hegel argues 
that it would not be possible to realize that actual uni­
versality which the sociopolitical order must possess for 
its authority if the individual remains tied to the 
’arbitrariness’ of private property. Thus individuals must 
transcend their selfish and egoistic ends in relation to the 
general community in order to facilitate their actual and 
objective universal end. Therefore the Hegelian system re­
quires that property maintain itself as property yet shed 
its merely egoistic and private character. The family, 
particularly the rights of inheritance of the family, accom­
plishes this rather ambivalent task since the family prop­
erty is owned by the whole family rather than a single 
member. The universality of the property is guaranteed by 
means of the limitations on the freedom of bequest, and 
being anchored in the family through inheritance for several 
generations, property is more or less entrusted to the in­
dividual by the general community. Marcuse suggests that by 
making the moralizing and eternalizing of property the spe­
cific function of the family, the state is elevated above 
the sphere of property insofar as society and the state are 
relieved of the task of the primary ’peremptory’ safeguard­
ing of property.
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As the social entity for whom the moral evils of pri­
vate property pose the least danger, the family in Hegel's 
analysis appears as mysteriously impervious to the vicious 
effects of social dissension, antagonism, and divisiveness 
as any ideological picture of "mother" and the family would 
have us believe today. In both cases the implication is that 
somehow the family, as substantial entity, exudes a protective 
cloak of lawful, ethical principles which shield each family 
member from the immoral chaos, passion, or irrationality of 
the greater social environment as long as that family member 
remembers familial "piety," executes his familial duties, and 
sets about contributing his bit towards fending off the roving 
and rootless rabble by starting his own family as soon as pos­
sible. Were it possible to consult those women who were at 
once expected "to do for" the family and to symbolize the 
purity, the love, and the morality of the family, the idea of 
the family's natural immunity to the vices of human greed, 
abuse, opportunism, and general inhumanity to others might be 
found strikingly over-generalized. To the extent that Hegel's 
attempt to transcend the particularity of private property by 
entrusting it to the family follows this kind of logic it is 
necessary to reconsider whether the moment of universality can 
actually be realized if the family is so "burdened" by the 
dynamics of private ownership, insofar as private ownership 
manifests itself as exclusivity and division among individuals 
in civil society along the lines of financial assets.
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In the Manuscripts of 1844 Marx criticizes the con­
cept of communism offered by the French Socialists Proudhon, 
Fourier, and Saint-Simon as immature and incomplete insofar
as they have not "grasped the positive essence of private
15property and just as little the human nature of need."
This immature communism, he argues, attempts an historical 
proof for itself by referring to disconnected historical 
phenomena opposed to private property whereas it is necessary 
that the entire revolutionary movement finds its empirical 
and theoretical basis in the movement of private property, 
which when positively transcended is the real appropriation 
of the human essence by and for man.
Because material private property is the "material 
perceptible expression of estranged human life," the move­
ment of private property, i.e., production and consumption, 
is ". . . the perceptible revelation of the movement of all 
production until now, i.e., the realisation or the reality 
of man."^^ The positive transcendence of private property 
therefore is the positive transcendence of all estrangement 
and the appropriation of human life, and furthermore is the 
return of man from a particular mode of production, of which 
the family is one, to his human or social mode of existence.
Marx emphasizes that this positive transcendence of 
private property cannot be understood as "direct one-sided 
gratification" in the sense of "possessing" or "having," 
for it is the appropriation by man of his total essence in
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a total manner, i.e., as a whole man. Instead of the im­
poverished notion of private property as an object that is 
only "ours" when we have it, i.e., when it is used by us,
Marx suggests that each of man’s human relations to the 
world, whether of a physical or mental character is, in its 
orientation to an object, the appropriation of that object 
and the appropriation of the human world. Thus the trans­
cendence of private property is the "complete emancipation 
of all human senses and qualities," which allows man to re­
late to things for the sake of the thing, but with the thing
itself understood as "an objective human relation to itself
17and to man, and vice-versa." In this way need or enjoyment 
lose their egotistical character and nature loses its char­
acter of mere utility by becoming human use.
This phenomenological analysis clarifies the funda­
mental contradiction in the concept of private property which 
Hegel apparently sought to circumvent by means of the family's 
communal ownership to the necessary family capital. But even 
when the family’s capital is pictured as a wholistic estate 
protected against dissolution by inheritance laws, Hegel's 
attempt to ground exclusive ownership in the sbustantial unity 
of the family seems to be only a disclaimer or qualification 
of the exclusive rights of private ownership insofar as we 
are now dealing with family against family rather than one 
independent individual against another. Ultimately it would 
seem that the effect of the family's sense of "having" on a
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developing consciousness would be the same as that of an 
individualistic sense of possession, for it is difficult 
to imagine how the concept of "ours" as family could be 
kept from suggesting the concept of "mine" as individual.
At the same time, it is questionable that the con­
cept of "ours" as family can be kept distinct from the con­
cept of "ours" as human species. Again in the Manuscripts, 
Marx writes that man is a species being because he adopts 
the species as his object in practice and in theory, and
because he treats himself as the actual living species,
18i.e., as a universal and therefore free being. The whole
character of a species is contained in the character of its
life-activity which for man is free, conscious activity in
which man's own life is an object for him.^^ Estranged
labor, however, reverses the relationship between a man and
his life-activity so that he makes his life-activity a mere
means to his existence instead of an object of his will.
Private property as the product and the necessary consequence
of estranged labor, as well as the means by which labor
alienates itself therefore institutionalizes the alienation
of truly human, social property, which is essentially the
estrangement of man's species nature from man. The extent
to which this estrangement ". . . means that one man is
estranged from the other, as each of them is from man's
20essential nature. . ." underscores the futility of attempt­
ing to counteract these effects of private property by means
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of the family, particularly when the family's substantial 
bond is manifested in property or as the care and activity 
of the family with respect of property.
The contradiction inherent in the family's relation­
ship to private property is even more clearly demonstrated 
in the case of the woman who is all too often considered a 
part of the family property herself, or is regarded as a 
servant or caretaker for whom the maintenance of property is 
actually a matter of self-fulfillment. This is, of course, 
the relation to the family and its material "substance" 
against which many women today most vigorously protest, but 
it is significant that this denial is expressed as a demand 
to be equally able to realize their individuality by means 
of a liberation from attention to family property, i.e., 
duties, etc. For those women who have realized that their 
activity, or labor, for the family is an unfree activity 
insofar as it is determined and demanded by family members 
who are under no similar obligations, the presence of es­
tranged labor and its concomitant manifestation as private 
property is no surprise. Ultimately it is the feminist out­
cry against the restriction and emptiness (in the sense of 
self-objectification) of the family situation that points 
to the failure of the family to counteract the egoism and 
estrangement of private property precisely because the 
bourgeois family demands that a woman participate in a form 
of alienated labor for the production and reproduction of
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the family as determined by the needs of the non-workers, i.e., 
the young who are preparing to leave the family and the man 
(usually) whose activity is other than housework and child- 
rearing. It should be emphasized at this point that the 
importance of a woman’s estrangement from the labor of main­
taining a family is directly connected to the concept of the 
family as the ’root’ of society and the subsequent pervasion 
of alienated labor as an acceptable and familiar condition.
In this sense, the woman’s question is basic to the estrange­
ment of labor throughout society, making her "gains" in civil 
society as the "equal" of her husband obviously flawed insofar 
as they too exhibit the features of alienation and exploitation 
criticized in the family.
Marx’s treatment of private property that we have 
been considering primarily deals with its phenomenological 
effect upon the individual to whom the concept of species 
being becomes increasingly vague and unreal, while the idea 
of truly human, social property becomes increasingly idealis­
tic. The problem of private property, however, can be seen 
to invade the family from the very moment of its (the fam­
ily’s) beginning insofar as marriage is objectified and made 
substantial in a relationship to property which is exclusive.
To the extent that marriage and the family are intended to 
establish the boundaries between "our" things and "their" 
things, and to limit the obligations of "our" cooperative 
efforts to the practical, i.e., commercially expedient.
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scope of this particular family's productive activity, it 
is questionable that Hegel's ideal of self-conscious love 
is ever realized. In this sense the concept of marriage 
is such that it represents for any two particular members 
of civil society an economic union in which a union on the 
level of mind is of little consequence.
Contemporary trends point to the degree that marriage 
has indeed become identified with a kind of business partner­
ship, where the business is to both accumulate capital and 
produce heirs for its inheritance, but also point to the fact 
that the structure of marriage in bourgeois society actually 
has a damaging effect upon the union of minds or self- 
conscious love. As the practice of sequential marriage is 
becoming more acceptable, many other people refuse to admit 
the institution, as ceremony and legality, into the realm of 
their relationship in an attempt to clearly differentiate 
between their human, emotional bonds and a business agreement. 
Both cases evidence to extent to which marriage as a property 
arrangement reduces the dimension of human response and feel­
ing in the interests of material gain.
Although the processes by which marriage is losing, 
or has lost, its ideal character as ethico-legal love properly 
demand sociological analysis, the fact that marriage cannot be 
simplistically defined as a love relationship with a unique 
effect on one's economic concerns is important in working out 
the problem of liberating the woman of the family without
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destroying the family, specifically, without destroying its 
capacity to engender a consciousness of unity and commonality 
among human beings. Clearly, if it is the family's property 
and imposition of estranged labor that can be seen to falsify 
the ideal characteristics which would contribute to the ad­
vance of reason towards freedom, it is not the family per se 
that must be "abolished," but its limiting and alienating 
features. Particularly as the world becomes increasingly 
interdependent and global in scope, the aspects of the family 
which have in the past been necessary for its survival, and 
therefore for the survival of its members as individuals 
(such as its capacity to cooperate as a productive unit apart 
from the organization of civil society, and to provide for 
most of the needs of its members in a relatively self- 
sufficient fashion) should today be given the kind of critical 
analysis that would be capable of understanding the family in 
a new sense. Instead of looking for ways in which the family 
as economic unit may reassert itself in civil society, it 
would seem timely to reconsider the relationships of family 
members to the family with respect to human beings' unique 
potential for recognizing their species as their essential 
being.
In criticizing the French philosophers, Marx observes 
that their proposal to replace marriage with the 'community 
of women' is simply to make women communal property with the 
same aspects of prostitution as is distinctive of the concept
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of "universal" private property. Marx criticizes this ap­
proach as the expression of infinite degradation in which 
man exists for himself. Instead he argues that the rela­
tion of man to woman is the direct, natural, and necessary 
relation of person to person, in which man’s relation to 
nature is immediately his relation to man, and his relation 
to man is immediately his relation to nature. Furthermore, 
he finds in this relationsihp the expression of man's own 
progress towards the full realization of his human and 
natural essence.
From this relationship one can therefore judge man’s 
whole level of development. From the character of 
this relationship follows how much man as a species 
being. as man, has come to be himself and to com­
prehend himself; the relation of man to woman is 
the most natural relation of human being to human 
being. It therefore reveals the extent to which 
man’s natural behaviour has become human. or the 
extent to which the human essence in him has become 
a natural essence--the extent to which his human 
nature has come to be natural to him . . . and .
. . man's need has become a human need . . . the
extent to which he in his individual existence is
at the same time a social being.21
Hegel argued that marriage must be monogamous be­
cause personality only attains its self-consciousness through 
consciousness of itself in another, but to the extent that 
legal monogamy militates against man’s realization of truly 
human behavior by encasing the relationship to man and to 
nature in the legal and ideological trappings of ownership 
and estranged labor, it is apparent that marriage does not 
facilitate the attainment of self-consciousness. And if 
the demands of ownership and estranged labor are such that
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an individual's relationship to another person must be ex­
clusive of all other such relationships, it is apparent that 
marriage is not the sort of necessary relationship to nature 
conducive to man's developing consciousness of his species 
essence, i.e., of his capacity for free conscious activity, 
but rather the obstruction to this rational development which 
ceases its movement in the essentially accidental relation­
ship of two particulars.
Although an emphasis on the nature of a woman's role 
in the family is frequently a sign that the "Woman Question" 
has been shelved while the more important matter of bringing 
about the revolution is discussed, it seems apparent that it 
is specifically the conditions of this role in bourgeois 
society that inform the particular questions of women's 
alienation from civil society and from their own personal 
development and being. To abstract women from the family role 
is to suggest that women are only an oppressed minority seek­
ing access to the opportunities of civil society as would 
any group of oppressed men. The question is then a matter 
which is not peculiar to women, or to a woman's consciousness 
insofar as it leaves the individual woman alone to work out 
a compromise between private and public life in her own 
particular (and alienated) situation. The significant risk 
facing society as a whole is the apparent trend towards just 
this sort of compromise insofar as it furthers the perversion 
of man's relationship to his life-activity. Hegel's location
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o£ the family as the Ethical root of the State speaks di­
rectly to the human need to realize the bonds of mutual 
concern and respect in humanity as a whole, and the his­
torical centrality of the woman to the family generates 
in her demands for greater opportunity, etc., a universal 
concern for the nature of our source of species-consciousness 
Nevertheless, Hegel's conception of the family itself is far 
too limited to structure the kind of experience that will be 
necessary for the realization of genuine human freedom. It 
is particularly in respect to these inadequacies that femi­
nist demands gain a universal and revolutionary character.
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THE REIFICATION OF SEXUAL BEING: A DIALECTICAL
APPROACH TO WOMEN'S LIBERATION
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PREFACE
Woman's fight for personal freedom and civil equality 
is essentially grounded in the notion that feminity is not a 
limiting condition. Thus the struggle is seeking to prove 
that because a woman's physique is generally less suitable 
for heavy manual labor, or because of her more immediate and 
more demanding relation to the biological reproduction of the 
species, a woman is merely sexually distinct but not sexually 
inferior. To a certain extent the feminist argument seems 
forced to employ the logic of the mind-body dualism in order 
to establish the irrelevance of physical function in matters 
of rational, i.e., intellectual and moral, capacity. In the 
words of Plato's argument for the equality of women, anatomi­
cal distinction does not imply differences that are relevant 
for "our purpose," which in Plato's case is the discrimina­
tion between individuals suited for Guardianship and those 
suited only for material maintenance of the Republic. 
Similarly women today argue that the feminine function in 
sexual reproduction does not limit individual function in 
human society.
True to the liberal, democratic, and especially 
American tradition, the struggle against individual oppres­
sion by virtue of group affiliation, or in this case
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physical categorization, initially appears to be a move which 
is wholeheartedly in support of self-determination and the 
right of individual variance. Thus the woman who is able to 
claim her freedom from the stereotypical roles and activities 
of women in general should find her freedom for individual 
expression greatly improved. The logic is straightforward 
and direct, moving within the tradition of bourgeois indi­
vidualism and the historical expansion of civil rights.
It would be pointless to deny that this logic does in fact 
work to the extent that equal opportunity programs and 
provisions make it possible for women to gain access to edu­
cational or career experiences which inevitably contribute 
to anyone's development as an individual. But it is as 
necessary to identify the inherent flaw in the logic of 
bourgeois privatism as it affects the women's struggle as 
it is to support the struggle in its efforts to break down 
(and/or through) the obstructions to feminine development in 
bourgeois society. There are two major reasons which I find 
to press the importance of such an analysis.
First, to the extent that the women's movement is 
potentially the most broadly based issue-oriented group on 
the political scene today, the well-publicized split between 
women who find total personal fulfillment in the home and 
those who insist that individual being must include life and 
activity outside the home threatens to render the women's 
movement as divided and consequently impotent as any past
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attempt to unify a genuinely revolutionary consciousness. 
Furthermore, this split can extend beyond the obvious divi­
sion between those who assume that the pursuits of children 
and education or careers are mutually exclusive, and can re­
sult in an internal estrangement from one's own capacities 
for independent thought and action. Thus because the alter­
native to the bourgeois family and home life is posed as an 
active public life subject to all of the qualifications of 
success in bourgeois society, those women who, like many 
men, find activity and participation in the mainstream of 
contemporary society unacceptable, seem to share the senti­
ments of women strongly defensive of family and children, 
even though they are distinctly independent and self- 
determined individuals.
Second, to the extent that the women's movement 
claims for its goal the liberation of human potential, but 
structures its struggle according to a formal concept of 
equality, it is marked by a reified notion of human being 
which cannot account for sexual human being. Thus the vic­
tory of the fully equal woman, and the fully legally- 
endowed woman, is the victory of the woman who appears as 
the non-sexual individual. In this sense, the internal 
fragmentation that is required for the utilization of the 
"freedom" to engage in market activities by selling one's 
labor power is now repeated, not only by its greater ex­
tension, but by the necessary sacrifice of the sexual
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dimension of personal being required for the full enjoyment 
of civil rights. The crisis of the content of women’s libera­
tion is thus the crisis of sexual being as essential to in­
dividual human being.
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KANTIAN REALITY: THE INTELLIGIBLE
CONTINGENCY
Kant begins his introduction to the Critique of Pure 
Reason with the assertion that all knowledge must begin with 
experience. The human "faculty of knowledge" would be in­
active, he argues, unless objects affected the senses in such 
a way as to (1j produce representations, (2) arouse the 
understanding to compare these representations, and (3) by 
combining or separating them, develop the knowledge of ob­
jects which is known as experience.^ The Kantian picture of 
human understanding is that of a product of the experiential 
given and the conceptual given(s), or of the reality of ma­
terial being and rational perception, the former (in both 
cases) being in principle unknowable (in a direct sense).
Kant recognized that the determinative force of the structure 
of our perceptive faculties had to be analyzed and understood 
if the Enlightenment vision of a thoroughly rational and 
knowable world was to achieve the status of truth. Thus for 
Kant the crucial question with respect to our empirical
knowledge is that of ". . . what our own faculty of knowl-
2edge . . . supplies from itself."
In the first part of the Transcendental Doctrine of 
Elements, the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant gives a fairly 
concise statement of the primary constituents of human
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understanding. On the material side of any cognitive ex­
perience stands the object, the worldly given, which is the 
source of all thought and yet ultimately unknowable in it­
self. Intuition, as both a property and a capacity, is the 
bridge which issues from the intellectual side of the ex­
perience and represents the ultimate limit to the relation­
ship between rationality and the world. Intuitions are 
yielded only by sensibility and all thought (as a means of 
understanding) is directed to intuition, Kant argues, but the 
relationship between knowledge and its object (s) is funda­
mentally a process of mediation and intervening steps. To 
the extent that Kant posits the reality of material existence 
beyond human understanding he defines appearance as precisely 
. . the undetermined object of an empirical intuition. . 
but the Kantian use of the term 'appearance' is limited to the 
labeling of the unknown. Matter resides in appearance and is 
subject to perception only "a posteriori," or through the 
process of sensation, Kant believes, but this matter has no 
determinative force. In its inaccessibility, the appearance 
lacks form and thus has no viable place in the ordered rela­
tions which constitute human understanding and consequently 
systematic reality. The form of all appearance, Kant argues, 
". . . must lie ready for the sensations a priori in the mind, 
and so must allow of being considered apart from all sensa­
tion."^
Kant's analysis of human understanding focuses upon
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reason's inability to make the "leap" towards the synthesis 
of definition of an object such that the principles of the 
object cannot be deduced from concepts but must be indirectly 
surmised by relating concepts to possible experience.^ Kant's 
effort to establish a thoroughly systematic rationalism de­
pended upon the capacity of the system to allow for the deduc­
tion of every given aspect from its basic principle. In his 
critical reconsideration of the Kantian analysis, Georg Lukacs 
argues that this notion of "intelligible contingency" is not 
the recognition of any facticity or content. Rather it is the 
absorption of the given into the system of concepts in such a 
way as to produce a "methodically purified world" in which ra­
tional categories are not applied to the real material sub­
stratum but to an intelligible subject matter.^ Lukacs iden­
tifies this process of absorption as the origin of the "double 
tendency" of bourgeois philosophy, i.e., the origin of the 
tendency to acquire an increasing control over the details of 
existence at the expense of the concept of existence as a 
whole.
In many ways, the struggle for woman's liberation ap­
pears to be snagged in the confusion of the intelligible sub­
ject matter for the real material substratum. We are, most 
of us, very clear about the extent to which femininity cannot 
be defined along the lines of traditional feminine helpless­
ness, weakness, and dependence in contrast to traditional
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male strength, reliability, and protectiveness. We are not 
at all clear about the nature of femininity, or consequently 
masculinity, in its positive sense, and to the extent that 
the mere suggestion of sexual identification appears to 
threaten the demand for equal recognition by the legal and 
economic institutions of our society, there is little sig­
nificant effort being made to achieve some substantial under­
standing of the human implications of sexual bifurcation. 
Instead the concept of femininity is being more and more 
closely associated with the array of Kant's "things-in- 
themselves," i.e., it is increasingly becoming understood 
as an entity fundamentally characterized by given-ness and 
separated from human understanding by the same void which 
extends between all objects whose origins cannot be accounted 
for in terms of systematic rationalism and the concepts which 
deliver the whole of human knowledge. What we have come to 
understand about femininity is that biological distinction 
of itself does not determine social behavior. What we have 
not begun to understand is the way in which human social be­
havior depends upon that biological distinction.
It is specifically the dialectics of sexuality 
which is immediately threatened by the current tendency to 
treat sexuality as a merely recreational concern that 
ought not intrude upon the business of making one's mark 
upon the world. This is not, however, to suggest that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
a return to sex stereotyping and the relegation of woman to 
the family and strictly domestic concerns is in order. That 
woman's place and function in the bourgeois, patriarchal 
family did imprison the total individual in a role whose 
virtue it was to be the support and comfort of the "superior" 
human being is not in question, nor can there be any doubt 
that a relationship bound by so rigid a form is unable to 
sponsor the growth and self-realization of the individual.
But to the extent that one's being is only actualized by and 
through the activity of becoming, either in mediating inter­
action with the world or in immediate relation with other 
human beings, there is no real prospect for the liberation 
of femininity. Rather the reduction of the significance of 
one's biological identity is an extension of the impulse of 
systematic rationalism to dismiss the given in favor of its
own deductive detail when it becomes expedient to do so. Thus
as Lukacs comments with respect to the action understood from 
the contemplative stance:
. . . action, in the sense of changing reality, of an 
orientation towards the qualitatively essential and 
the material substratum, . . . consists in predict­
ing, in calculating as far as possible the probable
effects of those laws and the subject of the 'action' 
takes up a position in which these effects can be 
exploited to the best advantage of his own purposes.
. . . on the one hand, the more the whole of reality 
is rationalised . . . the more such prediction be­
comes feasible. On the other hand, it is no less 
evident that the more reality and the attitude of 
the subject 'in action' approximate to this type, the 
more the subject will be transformed into a recep­
tive organ ready to pounce on opportunities created
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by the system of laws and his 'activity* will 
narrow itself down to the adoption of a vantage 
point from which these laws function in his best 
interests. . . J
To the extent that the system has never operated in the best 
interests of the independent and self-respecting woman, nor 
in the best interests of the compassionate and cooperative 
man, its accommodation of women and the ideological promulga­
tion of sexless equality must be recognized as a matter of 
systematic convenience and not confused for genuine human 
liberation.
LAW AS A FORMAL CALCULUS
Although the legal struggle for women's rights is 
grounded in and informed by what is referred to as the 
essentially human yearning for self-reliance and self- 
direction, it is limited by the sense of justice to which 
it speaks, i.e., the justice which prevails in a world of 
legally buttressed unfreedom. Here justice is apparently 
achieved when women do not find their processes of mediation 
in the world and their engagement with other human beings 
recapitulating their traditional, repressive role in the 
patriarchal family. Legal justice is expected to be realized 
with the creation of the opportunity for the existence of the 
independently equal female person by the official recognition 
of the sexlessness of labor power, and of the potential root­
lessness, i.e., mobility, of the woman who is independent of
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the man. It can be expected that this recognition will make 
it possible for some women to realize the extent of social 
integration enjoyed by some men, but it can also be expected 
that an official legal recognition of sexual equality will be 
manifested as an indiscriminate denial of human sexuality in 
the public arena.
The occlusive feature of the legal arbitration of 
social relationships is not a unique phenomenon peculiarly 
arising with the issue of feminine equality. Rather it is 
the mark of the reified development of law that social rela­
tionships must be reduced to those few elements which allow 
of prediction, i.e., which can be counted on to support and 
facilitate a particular form of economic production. Lukacs 
locates the origin of the reified development of law in the 
period of the bourgeois revolution with the struggle against 
the notion of the Divine Right of Kings and hierarchical 
privilege. From the start the fight was the struggle of form 
versus content, he argues, rather than a conflict of princi­
ples, with the revolutionary class refusing to acknowledge 
the validity of a legal relationship which they saw as 
existing merely in fact.
At this time, the bourgeois class, in order to fa­
cilitate its own ascendency, defied the prevailing order on 
the basis of the assumption that the formal equality and 
universality of law, as expressed by the concept of natural 
law, was able to determine the content of the law actually
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Oregulating social relationships. But while the fight to 
realize the universal extension of human rights suggested 
by natural law was the attempt to ground law in reason and 
give it a rational content, the consolidation of bourgeois 
law after its first victories was the systematic abandonment 
of that rational project. Bourgeois law had to allow a 
wedge to be driven between the formal categories of law and 
its factual content in order to guarantee the political and 
economic content of its legal institutions and in order to 
halt the appeal of the opposition to its perception of the 
content of natural law. Out of this period of victory and 
consolidation, Lukacs suggests, law in bourgeois society 
gained the specific character of a formal calculus by means 
of which the legal consequences of particular actions can be 
most accurately determined.
Lukacs argues that the real basis for the development 
of law is a change in the power relations between classes, but 
that it is just these relations which are the limits of the 
closed system of statutes. To the extent that calculability 
is crucial to modern capitalism, it is necessary that the 
economic system be surrounded and supported by a system of 
justice and an administration which are similarly predictable, 
Lukacs points out that the transition from the old capitalist 
forms of acquisition to modern capitalism's strictly rational 
organization of work on the basis of rational technology 
could not have come into being if the dispensing of justice
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had been in any way "capricious." This need for calculation 
was thus the revolutionary bourgeois need for rational sys- 
temization and the abandonment of empiricism, tradition, and 
material dependence.
It is similarly the contemporary bourgeois need to 
discard the forms of human relations which no longer func­
tion as an aid for and support of the socioeconomic order but 
rather thwart its efficiency and challenge its authority.
In this sense it is the family which becomes an obstacle to 
the smooth operation of a system of production which depends 
upon the worker who is above all mobile, available, and free 
of any real dependents. It can be shown that capitalist pro­
duction previously relied upon the nuclear family for the 
reproduction of labor power qua labor power, and to some ex­
tent this is still the case: We have not yet accommodated
the science of "cloneing" or test-tube babies, although the 
theory is reputedly within our reach. But the family’s 
vulnerability to the demands of an increasingly inclusive 
system of education, entertainment, and recreation is demon­
strated both by the virtual disappearance of the extended 
family and by the "crisis" of the nuclear family. Consider­
ing the hours a child spends in school, in after-school 
activities and lessons, at summer camp, and of course in 
front of the television, it is clear that it is not the 
family, i.e., the significant and essentially specific adults 
in a child’s life which prepares the next generation for their
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stint of labor in the productive processes. This training 
and "conditioning" can be, and is, more efficiently done 
through the agencies and institutions of the social system 
itself. Thus the stable family is really of minimal use to 
the productive system, five years perhaps at the most, and 
poses a proportionally greater problem in its unprofitable 
function as the social unit which can nurture and create 
truly human relationships.
THE CONTEMPLATIVE STANCE: REIFICATION
AS A PROCESS
Lukacs defines the essence of rational calculation 
as ". . . the recognition and the inclusion in one’s calcu­
lations of the inevitable chain of cause and effect in cer­
tain events -- independently of individual 'caprice'."^
The advantage of this rational calculation is that one may 
determine what the chain of cause and effect in certain events 
should be, and then arrange one's life to make the most of 
it, or one may take advantage of protective devices and pre­
ventive measures to guarantee the predetermined sequence which 
appears most profitable. Because this approach to the world 
is grounded in the assumption that knowable laws govern all 
of the events which structure an individual's life and can 
therefore make it possible for the individual to achieve his 
greatest personal advantage by deferring to the movement of 
those laws, Lukacs suggests that it is a contemplative
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
15
posture. He argues that there is no qualitative difference 
in the structure of consciousness between that of the worker 
whose behavior is determined by the machine he observes, the 
entrepreneur who seeks to employ a particular type of me­
chanical development, and the technologist who seeks some 
form of profit in the appropriation of scientific principles 
by technology. It may be added that the same kind of con­
templative stance is apparent in the individual who attempts 
to live up to the ideological picture of "perfect" family 
life in all its faddish variations by conscientiously follow­
ing the prescription of the latest sex manual, child-raising 
manual, or cookbook. It is significant that family tradi­
tion and custom which also directs (to varying degrees) how 
one relates to one's spouse, how the children are raised, 
and how and what one eats is distinct in its nonrational 
character insofar as it is not calculated to coincide with 
the demands of the greater socioeconomic environment but 
finds its identity in standing apart from the world of public 
affairs.
But the adoption of a contemplative approach to the 
world, wherein one seeks independence through accommodation 
does not only divide the individual from the lawfully regu­
lated society into which he must by calculation find gainful 
entry. Lukacs finds that the individual develops a contempla­
tive attitude toward his own objectified and reified facul­
ties such that they are not perceived as organic parts of his
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personality. Instead, his qualities and abilities are per­
ceived as things which he can own and possibly capitalize 
upon without the danger of betraying an essentially unified 
subjectivity.^^ The extent to which this internal process 
of reification is expected and assumed in all human rela­
tions is well illustrated by Lukacs* reference to Kant's 
description of marriage as , . the reciprocal use made
by one person of the sexual organs and faculties of 
12another," for it is the prevalence of just this perception 
of marriage today which most deservedly draws criticism and 
calls for negation.
This kind of explicit denial of the whole person 
with whom one is engaged in a relationship expresses the 
complete rationalization of the world and the self in which 
calculation comes to be known as the supreme skill, pre­
dictability the supreme value, and individual success a 
matter of manipulative cunning. Despite the difficulty of 
reaching any agreement on the reality of the feminine es­
sence, it is generally agreed that the traditional implica­
tions of the descriptive term 'femininity* are those traits 
which are opposed to logical and calculating determination. 
Intuition, emotional and irrational response, and, above all, 
love stand forth as the mark of the quintessential feminine 
character. As Lukacs* analysis of the development of reified 
law has show, intuitive decision-making and "emotional" reac­
tion to the affairs of bourgeois market activity simply have
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no place in the world of rational economics. Similarly as 
Horkheimer observes with respect to the family’s socializing 
function, "If the individual . . .  is to be .. . habituated 
not to despair in the hard world , . . but to face it 
courageously, a pitiless lack of consideration for himself 
and others must become second nature to h i m , o b v i a t i n g  
any possible significance of "love." The point is that the 
dimensions of human being which are traditionally, albeit 
questionably, associated with femininity are a liability to 
the individual who demands entry into the reified economic 
and political world and who intends to achieve some degree 
of success in that activity.
To be sure, the correlation of femininity with the 
nonrational virtues is to fall dangerously near to the sin 
of begging the question, for it is precisely such myths about 
womanhood and its capacities that the women’s movement and 
Equal Opportunity Programs seek to explode. Nevertheless, 
it is the case that the newly "emancipated" woman will have 
to relinquish what shreds of the nonrational dimension of 
human being have been left her by default if she is to accom­
plish the integration into the reified world of economic and 
political activity which is to be made possible by the "open­
ing of doors," etc. In his book. The Crisis of Psychoanalysis 
Erich Fromme describes the precedent set during the French 
Revolution for this kind of non-liberating "emancipation."
At that time the theory that "souls have no sex" became a
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significant force in the bourgeois revolution and formed the 
basis of the demand for women’̂s political equality. But, 
Fromme argues, women's equality actually meant that woman 
was in her essence the same as man in bourgeois society. 
"Emancipation did not mean, therefore, that she was free to 
develop her specific, as yet unknown, traits and potentiali­
ties; on the contrary, she was being emancipated in order to 
become a bourgeois man."^^ Again, it is important to recog­
nize that the strategy of the women’s movement is determined 
by the goal of exposing the fallacies of sexual identity 
which restrict an individual to specific sorts of activities 
on the basis of their gender. The contradiction of this 
intention to free the individual from the restraints of sex 
stereotyping is that in order to prove that she too has the 
capacities for efficiency and logic, the woman must separate 
those specific aspects out of her total being, just as the 
socially acceptable man must, and begin to define herself 
totally in terms of them. Unless she is able to develop a 
contemplative attitude toward her own reified faculties, 
the extension of economic and political opportunities to 
women will only serve to prove the nondialectical concept 
of sexual difference which has so far barred the genuine 
integration of the feminine into society and which has con­
sequently established a firm wedge between the private and 
the public along the lines of the irrational versus the 
rational.
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Lukacs identifies the novel aspect of modern rational­
ism as its claim to the discovery of the principle by which 
all material phenomena in both nature and society are con­
nected. Whereas previous formal systems limited their pre­
dictions and calculations to the specific material of their 
focus, modern bourgeois rationalism claims to be the univer­
sal method by which to obtain knowledge of the whole of 
existence. It is this claim which undermines the rational 
project insofar as the attempt to make rational categories 
universally significant collides with the given-ness of 
empirical facts. Furthermore, Lukacs suggests that the at­
tempt to make a universal systematization of every given 
aspect of experience cannot resolve either the problem of 
the whole, or the problem of the ultimate substance of knowl­
edge which is necessary for the completion of the system. 
Lukacs finds that both of these problems are most clearly and 
most functionally resolved in Kant’s notion of "intelligible 
contingency," or the compromise between the ideal of 




It is traditional to think of the relationship be­
tween men and women as a problem beyond rational solution
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primarily because communication between them is basically 
flawed. The tendency is to mythologize the conflicts and 
misunderstandings as a "fact of life" and proceed on the 
assumption that men have their sphere of life, women theirs, 
and while both are absolutely necessary, communication be­
tween them is not. The tension produced by the mutual lack 
of understanding of each other adds variety and spice to 
life somewhat on the principle of the attraction of opposites, 
and it really is not worthwhile to challenge the natural 
sexual division of perception. Actually, this seems to be a 
nicely workable arrangement, not only allowing for difference 
but glorifying it as well, but for the problematic character 
of the unified and ultimately single world and its values. 
Events may allow two or more interpretations, but they re­
main fundamentally unique or they are shown to be separate 
events of a differing time and character. Thus we agree to 
disagree on the grounds of sexual difference at a cost which 
is generally either the denial of the importance of that 
difference or the denial of the importance of its confronta­
tion.
1. The Platonic Dialectic: The Logos of Being
In his essay, "On the Problem of the Dialectic," 
Marcuse analyzes the meaning of the dialectic beginning with 
its original use by Plato, in order to gain a critical per­
spective on its use in contemporary philosophy and in Marxist
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theory and practice. When the dialectic appears in contem­
porary philosophy as a kind of "salve" for the apparent neces­
sity of contradiction, Marcuse suggests, it has been misused 
as a means to avoid identifying contradictions in the ma­
terial world, much as when the disparity between perceptions 
and responses of persons of opposite sex is dismissed as 
inevitable and therefore beyond practical concern. Within 
Marxism, a similar tendency to accept that which is contra­
dictory in its unresolved state is manifested in the view 
that the dialectic is either a "residue of Hegelianism" 
which might as well be removed from Marxist theory and prac­
tice, or is a practical danger insofar as what is actually 
a regressive action might be claimed as a n e c e s s i t y . T h i s  
latter situation generally describes the attempt to trivialize 
the gaps and holes in communication between the sexes and to 
establish either one sex role or the other as the normative 
model for all social activities. Even when such an attempt 
involves the denunciation of the oppressive conditions of 
women, the tendency to accept a "natural" contradiction in 
sexual interaction sustains the value of a single sexual 
character which can be only arbitrarily isolated.
Marcuse argues that Plato understood the meaning of 
the dialectic in its most fundamental sense, i.e., in terms 
of its relation to "true being." In Plato's work the dia­
lectic is associated with the highest expression of human 
knowledge and belongs to the Greek sense of Logos, both as
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the Logos of being and as the Logos of human discourse which
makes true being "visible." In the Republic, Marcuse finds
dialectical human discourse referred to as a "power" by means
of which human reason is able to "see" being as it is in
itself, i.e., in "truth," while in the Philebus he notes
Plato’s opposition to the abuse of the dialectic as simply
an "instrument of cognition" or methodology which everyone
17can apply anywhere. The necessary relation between the 
dialectical ability and the comprehension of true being does 
not suggest that one might expect to find every individual 
in some sort of obvious opposition to another individual, 
such as woman to man, which automatically reveals the truth 
of the individual’s being, for this simplistic application 
of the dialectical method does not proceed beyond the appar­
ent disparity and unity.
For Plato, true being consists in the unity which is 
obscured by the multiplicity of material objects and indi­
viduals and thus eludes the grasp of purely empirical reason­
ing. Furthermore, true being is itself dialectical and 
therefore requires that the effort to conceptualize what be­
longs together must be accompanied by the effort to separate 
what only appears to be linked together. Ultimately it is 
not the form of opposition which is presented by the world 
that represents Plato's sense of the dialectic in relation 
to the Logos of being, but rather the rational capacity to 
probe beyond that form and confront the tension of opposites
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unencumbered by the immediate multiplicity of the world. In 
this sense we may expect to find that masculinity and 
femininity have a true unity and a true difference beyond 
that which we immediately encounter and yet which are avail­
able only to the rational process of making distinctions as 
first suggested by the immediate engagement with difference.
In the dialogues following the Republic, Marcuse 
finds Plato's conception of the dialectic moving towards 
the idea of the being of Being itself. In the Theatetus, 
Plato clearly states that the state of being can only be 
understood as a process of becoming, which is the result 
of movement, change, and combination with other being, and 
that there is no moment of absolutely independent being 
about the individual at all. Marcuse points out that this 
unceasing movement and unification must also apply to the 
ultimate Ideas which determine being in Plato's epistemology 
such that their ideal being is not simply unique and unam­
biguous, but is inclusive of multiplication, ambiguity, and 
finally coherence. Coming to terms with the being of being 
itself is thus the problem of locating the unity in multi­
plicity while maintaining the multiplicity: i.e., it is the 
problem of comprehending how being achieves being without
interrupting the movement and therefore arbitrarily isolât-
18ing what is only an aspect of the movement that is being.
My difficulty in coming to terms with the nature of
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sexual being begins with the ambiguity of the particular (or 
the many) rather than with that of the one, insofar as it is 
the character of femininity and its liberation which is in 
question. Nevertheless, Plato's sense of the dialectic's 
ontological dimension in which the main concern is to locate 
the one in the many without prohibiting its movement is 
instructive. Plato denies that being is either movement or 
permanence, sameness or difference, and insists on something 
beyond such oppositional situations. Instead, it is Mar­
cuse's conclusion, from Plato, that everything which ex­
ists does so by being different from everything else. It is 
clear that this is a crucial determination for the concept 
of sexual identity because it squarely confronts the necessity 
of contrast. Whatever we may find femininity to be we cannot 
expect to find it in isolation, for it is only in distinction 
to that quality of sexuality which is different from it, 
masculinity, that femininity achieves a genuinely forceful 
presence.
Marcuse refers to Plato's explanation in the Sophist 
of the necessary relation between every existing individual 
and its specific nonbeing as the point at which the individ­
ual is differentiated not only from other individuals but 
also from Being i t s e l f . A g a i n  the concept of difference 
is central to the identity of the individual for it is the 
factor of difference between the individual and its appro­
priate nonbeing which distinguishes it from that which is
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neither difference nor sameness (Being). In this sense, that 
which constitutes the individual's other is of fundamental 
importance to the individual's identity both for its distinc­
tion among individuals and for its distinction as an individ­
ual. Similarly being itself has no sexuality even though it 
must suggest sexuality in order to suggest life at all. The 
sexuality of the existing individual however can only be made 
to be ambiguous to the extent that the difference between 
male and female is obscured and repressed.
For Plato the relation between existing individuals 
cannot be other than a dynamic one for the freezing of a par­
ticular relation denies the movement of becoming which is 
essential to his concept of true being. As Marcuse finds in 
the Philebus, Plato's insight into the dynamism of being is 
dominated by the concern for that which has achieved being, 
or that being which is unified and yet a plurality. Plato's 
approach to this problem of becoming focuses upon the emer­
gence of being from every relationship of being and nonbeing 
which must consequently engage in another such relationship. 
He suggests a threefold classification of being with which 
to account for the various terms of the dialectic of being:
1) the determined, 2) the undetermined, and 3} the 
undertermined-being becoming determined being. It is this
third category which represents the true and essential
20being. The dynamic character of this third category 
sponds to Plato's sense of the movement, change, and
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multiplicity which "is" being and to understand it requires 
the use of dialectical reason.
At the same time Plato's concept of the achievement 
of being stresses the potential for unity, permanence, and 
sameness which also characterizes being insofar as Plato 
believes being must find shape in the flux of its existential 
relationships. Thus it would seem that the relationship 
between being and nonbeing is structured by points or moments 
of essential unity in which what had been a developing being 
is at rest in a certain stage of development. In this sense, 
the contrast that is necessary for the definition of feminin­
ity would become unnecessary once the characteristics of 
feminine sexuality have achieved a certain self-sufficiency 
comparable to the achievement of being. Indeed, the notion 
of the merely incidental nature of sexual contrast tends to 
dominate the concept of sexual identity such that one's 
sexual being is not understood as dependent upon its appro­
priate other. It is this trivialization of sexual contrast 
which leads to a neglect of the dialectical nature of sexual­
ity in the question of feminine liberation.
It is, however, the specifically Platonic approach 
to the rational dialectic of being which perceives the rela­
tion between universal and particular being in the objective 
dimension of Logos and concepts. To the extent that Plato 
is concerned with the nature of being in itself, he is con­
cerned not with the active achievement of being for itself
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but rather with the achievement that is at least cognitively 
static. Thus it is a temptation to dismiss the dialectic as 
merely a necessary method which most closely parallels the 
form of the problem of discerning true being, true unity, 
amidst the multiplicity and flux of particular being, and 
similarly to dismiss the dialectic as merely the most viable 
means for picking out the elements of femininity from the 
field of sexual characteristics in general. Such a dis­
missal, however, also dismisses the individual for whom being 
means the subjective involvement in becoming. Sexuality is 
not a matter of objective decision for the individual for 
such objectivity would render it meaningless. It is rather 
in the relation to its nonbeing or significant otherness 
that sexuality realizes the meaning of masculinity or femi­
ninity, and this is a subjective realization for it is 
achieved through essentially subjective relationships.
2. The Hegelian Dialectic: Historical Being
Plato's consideration of the completion of the mean­
ing of the dialectic suggests that becoming accomplishes a 
static sense of being expressed by the Logos of being itself 
and the objective concepts which are used to understand that 
Logos. To the extent that Plato's major concern with the 
dialectic is the process of becoming of being in itself, it 
is beyond the influence of the consciousness of the subjective 
particular just as the particular sexuality of the individual
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
28
is realized in only the universal sense when it is abstracted
from the subjective dimension of relationships. Nevertheless,
Plato's sense of the achievement of being insofar as the
process of becoming in its entirety continually resolves into
moments of particular being is what Marcuse locates as the
21origin of the insight into the historicity of being. With 
Hegel this insight is developed into an understanding of the 
essential evolution of all being in which the necessity of 
becoming grounds every moment of being in that previous moment 
from which it has developed.
The Hegelian effort to retrieve the ontological dia­
lectic from the dimension of the objective begins with the 
conception of philosophy as that which establishes itself in 
a processual fashion, first by creating its own moments and 
then by passing through all of them. In the Phenomenology 
of Mind, Marcuse finds that Hegel’s sense of this dialectical 
movement is that it is the "truth" of philosophy insofar as
". . . its very concept (the concept of philosophy) implies 
22its existence." The dialectical method is the real dimen­
sion of the method of philosophy for Hegel because it is able 
to comprehend each moment of being as a result of a becoming 
which reflects the nature of the totality of being. Specifi­
cally, the dialectical method is able to free all being from 
its apparent rigidity and isolation, much as it is able to 
penetrate the multiplicity for Plato, but then for Hegel is 
able to consider being in its true essence by comprehending
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the evolutionary movement of the whole into a new and 
"higher" being. Marcuse emphasizes that this is a sense 
of the necessity of becoming in which the real dimension of 
each being is determined by that from which it has developed. 
Thus being itself is the origin and the basis of the dia­
lectic for Hegel, rather than the dialectic being simply a 
means of knowing or grasping the meaning of being by a 
cognitive subject.
Hegel's insight into the historicity of the dialectic 
suggests a process of development which cannot be abstracted 
from the individual in which it is realized, such as is sug- 
fested by the notion of an objective scheme according to which 
individuals will be found to conform. Typically, the growth 
and development of an individual's sexuality tends to be re­
garded as just such an objective process, with one's tastes 
and abilities developing according to the statement of one's 
genitals despite one's experiences or lack of experiences and 
their effect on one's sense of self. A similar attitude 
toward the nature of one's sexual being and its transcendent 
ability to become established and sustain the self indepen­
dently of one's interactions with other persons appears to 
inform the critical and practical attempts to overcome sexual 
oppression insofar as those attempts seek to minimize the 
consideration of sexual difference in a world where the pro­
ductive processes move farther and farther away from the 
sense of a natural division of labor. Hegel's concept of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
30
the individual as the embodiment of the origin of which it 
is also the result is particularly instructive in its asser­
tion of the significance of the ground of one*s being. This 
can only lie in that from which one has developed, for genuine 
and necessary sexual identity must be the result of subjective 
dialectical sexual development. Thus it becomes important to 
question the nature of sexual distinction for which any real 
and present recognition of sexual difference is seen either 
as a threat or a potential threat to the supposedly non- 
sexual dimensions of the individual.
Hegel’s analysis of the subjective character of his­
torical being also raises the question of the relation of 
sexual identity to one’s full sense of individual or personal 
being, for if one’s sexual identity is merely a bit of 
attached data to be used or ignored at will, there is clearly 
no fundamental violence done to the individual when sexual 
differentiation is obscured. If, on the other hand, sexual 
identity in some sense grounds and informs the whole of indi­
vidual being, not only in terms of shaping and developing 
one’s responses to the world, but also in terms of its con­
stitutive force with respect to the totality of being, the 
eradication of genuinely sexual distinction from the arena 
of human engagement and activity threatens both a reduction 
of individual being and a repression of human being itself.
In this sense it is the individual which is the substance of 
the essential being of being, or as Marcuse finds it in the
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Phenomenology of Mind, it is the substance of the individual
mind, the subject, which undertakes the "tremendous labour
of world history" by giving shape to the whole of the po-
2 3tential content of the universal mind.
To the extent that the philosophical method, i.e., 
the dialectical method, is indeed able to consider the nature 
of the totality by means of the conprehension of the particu­
lar being, it is the task of philosophy to question the 
nature of sexual distinction not only in terms of its reified 
and nondialectical imposition, but also in terms of its his­
torical perseverance which Hegel suggests is an evolutionary 
process towards a "higher" and ultimately free being. It 
appears possible of course to reduce this historical pervasive­
ness to the necessity of biological determination, but such a 
reduction forfeits any capacity to deal with the specifically 
human nature of sexuality insofar as it reduces sexuality to 
a phenomenon so broad in scope that it includes far more than 
animals but anything which lives at all. The biological basis 
of sexuality is not in question, nor does it figure signifi­
cantly in the self-consciousness of Hegel's concept of the 
universal mind, but the true and fully free realization of 
human sexuality towards which the individual processes of be­
coming are directed is a dimension of self-consciousness with­
out which a realization of the total sense of human being 
would be incomplete. Thus we may return to Hegel’s sense of 
the self-understanding of the individual mind as necessary
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for the self-understanding of the universal mind and reassert 
the twofold nature of the philosophical task which arises with 
the determination to take action against the outrage of sexual 
oppression. If sexual discrimination in the matter of indi­
vidual becoming is repressive and arbitrary, the denial of 
human sexuality as it is developed in and by the differentia­
tion of individual being is repressive and arbitrary as well.
Marcuse argues that Hegel's concept of the historical 
dialectic is grounded in the concept of being as "self identi­
fication in other b e i n g . A s  developed in the Phenomenology 
of Mind, this concept of being includes both the essential 
movement of all being and the oneness and sameness that allows 
for the cognitive subject who is able to conceptualize and 
claim his own identity. In this sense, the self-preservation 
of being throughout the various contradictions of its move­
ment, i.e., throughout its encounters with other being and 
with its own nonbeing, is the subjective development which 
ultimately creates that which Being (not individual being) 
really is. The subjective development is thus distinctive 
of a particular individual for whom relation to another in­
dividual does not bring the movement of this development to 
a pause or halt but rather gives it articulation through the 
"contradiction" of its own movement in its contrast to that 
of the other. This relation to other being is a moment of 
unity which must encompass fundamentally diverse and indi­
vidual beings in such a way as to preserve the identity of
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the minds or consciousnesses for whom the unity brings in­
dividual definition. Unity is not in this sense, any more 
than it can really be in the expression of sexual love, the 
submergence of the individual into a "whole" of a separate 
and novel identity, for to the extent that it is a moment 
in which self-identification in other being is achieved, this 
unity is itself only the result of the active becoming of two 
separate individuals.
Furthermore, this unity is an essential moment in the 
expression and realization of individuality for it is the 
moment in which the movement that defines individuality is 
preserved precisely in the affirmation of the union, the 
moment in which the identity of the individual cannot be in 
doubt because it is by means of that identity that the union 
is achieved. The intimate and psychologically profound rela­
tionship of sexual love must be the archetypical moment of 
union between two individuals, for it is in this relationship 
that difference is immediately understood as both the source 
and the scope of joy. This difference however, is that dif­
ferentness which is essential to individual being and is no 
more a matter of simplistic physical categorization than it 
is a matter of disagreement over daily routine. Rather it 
is the differentness which is the result of a particular in­
dividual's becoming, or that differentness which grounds and 
informs the unique identity of the individual. It is in 
coincidences with this essential differentness that the
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historical dialectic of the individual's development achieves,
in Hegel's terminology, "self-identification in otherness,"
or as Marcuse puts it, it is through the concretely subjective
involvement in which one affects and is affected by others
that individual being . . receives itself and behaves as 
2 5a self." Sexual love, as the subjective relationship of 
individual human sensuality, both physical and mental, is 
thus the moment which can preserve the diversity of individ­
ual being in the unity which binds two individuals together.
But in its reified expression as a legal or merely customary 
contract it is as removed from the preservation of diversity 
as it is from the realization of what is in Hegelian terms 
the self-understanding of the universal mind.
3. The Marxian Critique: The Task of Historical Realization
Hegel's insight into the historical dialectic achieves 
its greatest force at the level of theoretical construction.
If we accept, and consequently undertake, the aphoristic 
Hegelian motto: "The real is the rational and the rational 
is the real," the development of human sexuality and sexual 
difference can be understood as a necessary condition for 
human freedom. But Hegelian idealism, despite its historical 
emphasis, only provides for an understanding of that develop­
ment as a total, and completed system. From the perspective 
of a single, finite, and above all particular human existence, 
i.e., that of the historical subject, the Hegelian articulation
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of human development appears to suggest a degree of evolu­
tionary inevitability which could easily justify the suppres­
sion of critical thought and action. For Marx, the necessity 
of countering the Hegelian exaggeration of universal human 
being was as clear as the necessity of preserving and employ­
ing Hegel's dialectical method;
But because Hegel has conceived the negation of the 
negation, from the point of view of the positive 
relation inherent in it, as the true and only posi­
tive, and from the point of view of the negative of 
all being, he has only found the abstract, logical. 
speculative expression for the movement of history, 
which is not yet the real history of man as a given 
subject, but only the act of creation, the history 
of the origin of man.25
The task of history, therefore, once the world be­
yond the truth has disappeared, is to establish the 
truth of this world. The immediate task of 
philosophy, which is at the service of history, 
once the holy form of human self-estrangement has 
been unmasked, is to unmask self-estrangement in 
its unholy forms. Thus the criticism of heaven 
turns into the criticism of the earth, the criti­
cism of religion into the criticism of law and 
the criticism of theology into the criticism of 
politics .27
As the most basic form of human difference, the con­
cept of sexual distinction is at once the most and least 
clear, the most and least simple, for the reality of sexual 
identity consistently eludes categorization and definition.
As a foundational aspect of social human being, human sex­
uality is still not only an "unholy form of human self­
estrangement," but a means and a source of human (both male 
and female) victimization for we persist in social
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relationships that assume an adequate understanding of sexual 
being in the face of conscious ignorance. Indeed, the tradi­
tional exemption of sexual being from the dimension of human 
advancement still casts a shadow over the legitimacy of a 
philosophical enquiry into human sexuality, even though it 
is precisely the notion of sexuality as a self-evident, non- 
developmental given that binds sexual expression to experience 
of complication, guilt, hate, and fear.
At this point the concepts of masculinity and femininity 
represent an historical form of oppression which, unless or 
until it is overcome, denies the realization of human history. 
Nevertheless, it is by means of the recognition of the ma­
terial basis of these concepts that human development must 
progress. As the real historical subject who understands 
the potential of the historical dialectic and yet claims it 
for his own, the individual may thus profitably turn to Marx's 
analysis of human sensuality as an outline of the necessary 
elements of a genuine and free human sexuality.
HUMAN SENSUALITY: THE PROCESS OF
DIALECTICAL DEVELOPMENT
In the third of his 1844 Manuscripts, Marx writes:
All history is the history of preparing and develop­
ing "man" to become the object of sensuous conscious - 
ness, and turning the requirements of "man as man"
into his n e e d s . 2 °
History, he says, is a real part of natural history, and ulti­
mately natural science will be one with the science of man.
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The basis of this prediction is Marx's sense of the essen­
tial humanness of man's sense perception, not as the appro­
priation of "non-human" nature by the human perceiver, but 
because immediate, sensuous nature is for man human sensuous- 
ness. Man is the immediate object of natural science because 
it is only in the form of the "other man" that sensuous 
nature is present to him in its unmediated, natural being.
On the other hand, nature is the immediate object of the 
science of man because man is nature and can only achieve 
self-understanding with respect to his sensuous powers in 
the science of the natural world. What Marx suggests is 
that human sensuousness is the means by which both man and 
nature must be understood for because man finds the material 
for his objectification and therefore realizes his own con­
sciousness in nature, the nature which develops in human his­
tory is man's real nature.
Marx's analysis is of course particularly concerned 
with the extent to which the human aspect of nature exists 
only for social man thus necessitating the abolition of pri­
vate property. While nature should exist as the bond between 
men in which each of one's human relations to the world, 
i.e., seeing, hearing, thinking, loving, etc., is the appro­
priation of human reality in its orientation to the object, 
private property is the expression of the fact that man's 
objectification is also the alienation of himself. Instead 
of the realization of human nature, which is the realization
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of all the physical and mental senses, Marx finds that the 
sense of having, of direct possession, which is central to 
the concept of private property, estranges the senses by 
reducing man's engagement with nature to the dimension of 
use and, ultimately, capital. The abolition of private 
property is thus the emancipation of all human sense and 
qualities such that the senses become "theoreticians" in 
their practice, i.e., that the senses become as able to 
discern the distinctions in the object of sensual compre­
hension as the trained mind is able to make distinctions 
with respect to the object of its theoretical comprehension.
In the same way that Plato understood dialectical human 
discourse as a "power" enabling human reason to comprehend 
true being, Marx suggests that truly human sense perception 
is a power which, when able to discriminate between its 
"crude," generalized object and its aestheticized and par­
ticular object, is able to understand the "truth" of its 
human nature. Thus the indiscriminate sexual relationship, 
as a most appropriate example of an only incidentally human 
relationship, represents a preemptive concern with the physi­
cal function even when it assumes a Casanova style of adoring 
appreciation for Love in general. Women in general, or Men in 
general. To the extent that the relationship merely satisfies 
the general capacity of the individual, it aborts the theoreti­
cal character of an essential social relation through which 
two individuals might objectify, and thereby realize, them­
selves.
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When the senses become "theoreticians" in their prac­
tice, Marx argues, their object is transposed into the ob-
2Qjective human relation both to itself and to man. In this 
sense the nature of the object of human sense perception for 
the social man is not limited by the use to which it can be 
put in the exclusively human world, although the human rela­
tion which it must come to objectify has constitutive force. 
At first blush it might appear that Marx is suggesting a 
sophisticated but nonetheless "mystical" relationship between 
man and nature such that nature is what we perceive it to be 
with practical considerations merely illusory. But Marx 
particularly emphasizes the extent to which man is the object 
of natural science because it is in nature and through man’s 
sensuous activity that man realizes or objectifies his own 
being. He refers to the history of industry as the "open 
book of man's essential powers" and defines industry as the 
actual, historical relationship of nature to man even though 
he understands the development of nature in human history 
through industry as its estranged form of development.^^ 
Despite its dehumanizing effect, industry as the practical 
medium by means of which man’s understanding of nature has 
transformed human life and prepared human emancipation is 
the foremost expression of the centrality of man’s self- 
objectification in nature, i.e., it is the expression of 
the centrality of his sensuous human relations to the achieve­
ment of truly human life.
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To the extent that human sexuality describes the 
immediate relation of man and woman, it is the expression 
of human sensuality in which nature for the individual is 
the human essence. For Marx it is in this natural species- 
relationship that . . man's relation to nature is im­
mediately his relation to man. . ." and that man's social
31development is most clearly perceived. In this sense, 
one human being's need for another is the expression of the 
social being of the individual who realizes his sensuous 
"power" through a natural but distinctively social relation.
But it is necessary to see in Marx's beautiful phrasing the 
ideal of a sexual relationship which while not beyond human 
experience, is certainly dependent upon the human develop­
ment and realization of sexuality. One of the most signifi­
cant insights of feminist theory is that which penetrates the 
guise of protection and concern which masks a fundamental 
inability to develop such a relation except through domina­
tion and possession. Actions which seek to expose and destroy 
those conditions which support the reduction of human sexuality 
to the typical one-sided appropriation associated with pri­
vate property (in Marx's terms, the sense that an object is
32only "ours" when we "have" it, when it is used by us) are 
therefore potentially liberating for human nature, at least 
in their conception. But to the extent that the institution 
of private property has had an equally dehumanizing effect 
on all of the human senses this is an insight which must
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radically transform all of human sexuality, just as the 
emancipation of all human sense must be thorough, in order 
for need or enjoyment to lose its egotistical character and 
in order for nature to become truly human nature.
Marx writes that when the objective world becomes
the world of man's essential powers all objects will conform
and realize man himself, and man himself will become the 
33object. He suggests that a radically social society is 
one in which the need and enjoyment of other men will be 
also the individual's appropriation, and in which the in­
dividual's activity with others will become an organ for 
expressing one's own life and a mode for appropriating human 
life. In the subjective aspect of sensuality, he suggests, 
the senses of the social man are essentially different from 
those of the nonsocial man because the full richness of sub­
jective human sensibility can only be achieved through the 
objectively unfolded richness of man's essential being. Thus 
the sense object can only be the confirmation of an individ­
ual's essential power if that power has been developed by and 
through the experience in such a way as to seek out and re­
spond to that object. Only music can awaken the sense of 
music, Marx points out, and yet only the man with a musical 
ear can appreciate beautiful music. Similarly, the starving 
man is only concerned with the abstract existence of food, 
not with its human form. Marx does not identify it but it 
is clear that human sexuality is susceptible to the same
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kind of impoverished and abstract existence if the power of 
sexual response is crippled by appropriation of the objecti­
fication of the human essence.
Marx does say that this objectification of the human 
essence is required, both in its theoretical and practical 
aspect, to make man’s sense human and to create the human 
sense corresponding to the full wealth of human and natural 
s u b s t a n c e . I t  is this sense of the evolution of human 
sensuality which must inform the dialectics of human sex­
uality insofar as the liberation of sexuality in general, 
and femininity and masculinity in particular, must create 
the conditions for the realization of the human essence in 
the sexual relationship. When the struggle for liberation 
makes the demand for conditions which militate against the 
expression of sexuality in order to free the individual it 
is urgently necessary to distinguish the arbitrary sexist 
notion of proper sexual roles from the expression of human 
sexuality through which human sense is created and men and 
women's sense is made human. While the diversity of human 
individuality makes the definition of the individual accord­
ing to group characteristics patently absurd, the extent to 
which man is a sensual being who realizes himself in nature 
and for whom the sexual relationship is his most immediate 
social relation implies the falsity of denying the essential 
sexual being. Thus, to define a woman only in terms of her 
husband and family ignores and represses her individual
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identity. But to renounce any and all commitments between 
the sexes because they seem to have no possibilities other 
than the patriarchal form is not only to ignore the primary 
source of self-realization but is also to substitute an 
equally oppressive definition of the self, i.e., that of the 
private individual for whom human exchange and intercourse 
must always be a measurable compromise. Because human beings 
are not abstractly sexual beings, except by virtue of their 
estranged and alienated sensuality, it is specifically one's 
femininity or masculinity which must be realized if the re­
lationship truly objectifies man's essence.
THE PROMISE OF THE DIALECTIC:
HUMAN SPECIES BEING
In the first of the 1844 Manuscripts, Marx defines 
man as a species being because, as he puts it, . . man 
. . . treats himself as the actual, living species; because
35he treats himself as a universal and therefore free oeing." 
Man's particular distinction from animals, he says, is that 
whereas the animal is immediately one with its life activity, 
man is able to make his life activity the object of his will 
and his consciousness. While animals do produce, they can 
only produce what they immediately need and each animal's 
product belongs immediately to its physical body. Man how­
ever produces even when he is free from physical need and, 
Marx suggests, only truly produces in this state of freedom.
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not have to immediately involve it in his physical being, 
and man can produce in accordance with the laws of beauty.
All of these aspects of man's productive life demonstrate 
his species-being insofar as they express the whole charac­
ter of the species. The object of man's labor is thus the 
objectification of man's species-life. Its estrangement 
from him is an appropriation of his real objectivity as a 
member of the species. In the process human species-con- 
sciousness is reduced to a concept of the means to physical 
existence.
Furthermore, the estrangement of man from his life 
activity is the estrangement of man from man. When man 
confronts himself in the objectification of his species-life, 
he also confronts the other man, for it is man's essential 
nature, man's universal being, which is objectified in that 
product. In this sense, the degradation of man's spontane­
ous free activity to a means alienates all men from their 
essential nature, i.e., their species-being, and consequently 
limits the life of the species to the concept of the means 
for an individual life.^^
To the extent that man's natural species relation­
ship is the "direct, natural, and necessary relation of per-
7 7son to person," and, for Marx, the relation of man to woman, 
the categorization of man's sexual being as a mode of appear­
ance subject to the scheduling of the business world stands 
out as a further alienation of man's species activity. In
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this case, however, it is not the material product of the 
activity which is initially appropriated and presented to 
the individual as an alien, nonsocial thing, i.e., as a 
commodity, in the manner that the products of labor are.
Rather it is the case that a dimension of human being is 
presented to the individual as an expendable and negligible 
aspect of facticity which can be overcome through the 
sophisticated application of rational definition, i.e., 
through the internalization of a reified understanding of 
the apparently disparate elements of human being. Thus the 
tendency to insist on the nonsexual recognition of all 
human beings can be seen to intensify man’s estrangement from 
man, not as a direct appropriation of a product, but rather 
by straining the most natural and direct relationship through 
intimations of an inevitable oppression and abuse which will 
result. The appropriation is executed at this level by means 
of the perpetration of the sense that the direct man-woman 
relationship is only infrequently compatible with the freedom 
of the individual, and that the sophisticated human being can­
not allow himself the involvement of a natural species- 
relationship lest he in some way sacrifice his personal self.
CONCLUSION
The Marxian concept of man's species-being is central 
to the radical nature of the determination to develop the 
theoretical capacity of human sexuality, for it is this concept
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which asserts the necessity of the social realization of 
human being for the possibility of individual human freedom. 
Women cannot expect to fulfill their own unique and essen­
tially feminine potentials by simply denying that the sexual 
identity with which they are born has any relevance to their 
lives as modern, twentieth-century, technologically-adjusted 
individuals. To opt either for the demand that femininity is 
of no importance to the qualifications for the traditionally 
masculine pursuits or for the assertion that masculine and 
feminine qualities are interchangeable, existing in rela­
tively equal proportions in a standard, universal human 
psyche, is to reduce the women's struggle to the plaintive 
appeal of yet another "outgroup" wanting to be let "in."
If women, by virtue of their femininity, have a genuinely 
unique and as yet undeveloped contribution to make to the 
evolutionary process of the self-understanding of being 
itself, and thereby to the process of the evolution of human 
nature, it is imperative that the nature of femininity at 
least be preserved until it is understood. The necessity of 
this conservation is underscored by the dialectical nature 
of all being which implies that masculinity too is confront­
ing a fundamental struggle for liberation from its rigid 
antithetical stigmatization vis-a-vis the feminine. In 
short, it is the whole, i.e., the unity, and the "truth," 
of human sexuality and consequently the universal character 
of human being which is in question. If it has been held
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in a dehumanizing bondage by the form of the patriarchal 
family, it must find its liberation in the content of the 
essentially human, sexual, species-activity.
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INDIVIDUALITY: A CASE FOR
FAMILY UNITY
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PREFACE
In the first paper, "Women and the Family: A Case 
of False Universality," we have been able to examine the 
idea of the family in terms of its essential relation to 
civil society. By following Hegel's formulation of the 
family as the ethical root of the state we have seen that 
despite its subjective and particularistic appearance, the 
family is not conceptually complete until its relationship 
to the society which surrounds it is defined. For Hegel the 
family is the natural source of ethical human behavior be­
cause it exists as a single entity which does not, because 
it cannot naturally, act against itself. Against Hegelian 
idealism, however, the concrete nuclear family appears too 
often to be a sorry contortion of neglected possibilities 
and a misunderstood identity. As was shown in the first 
paper, woman's subordinate role in the family vitiates the 
experience of human universality thereby systematizing the 
acceptance of the exploitation of woman's more immediate 
involvement with sexual reproduction.
Woman's oppression by the traditional family struc­
ture is currently understood from the point of view of a 
sexless individual for whom the opportunities of civil 
society seem unjustly remote and inaccessible. The argument
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of the second paper, "The Reification of Sexual Being," asserts 
that masculinity or femininity (one's sexual identity) has an 
essential relationship to one's individual being and there­
fore cannot be shunted aside in an emancipatory theory of 
individuality. In this paper the primary concern was to lo­
cate the nature of sexual being in its dialectical relation­
ship to its sexual opposite in order to reveal the false 
concept of liberation which pervades the Woman's Liberation 
Movement. While many of the movement's accomplishments are 
important and necessary reforms, I believe it is equally neces­
sary to recognize that the concern for personal realization, 
particular rights and individual freedom is the standard 
justification for the isolated individual life and the atomis­
tic character of modern society. In the absence of both an 
understanding of and an appreciation of the social foundation 
of human being, which is epitomized by the sexual relationship, 
the Woman's Movement actually tends to contribute to the intensi­
fication of the modern alienated consciousness by insisting 
that sexual identity be reduced to an accidental aspect of the 
fully public individual.
The sexual relationship is central to the concept of 
the family, in all of its possible variations, for it is 
through the experience of this intimate human relationship 
that the conscious substitution of "we" for "me" occurs.
Today the family is being so severely scrutinized for its 
repressive relationship to the individual that its unique
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capacity for transforming the egotistical concern for the 
self into a radically social concern is not simply overlooked 
but forgotten. As we seek to reform the bourgeois family by 
ridding it of its arbitrary power relationships and oppres­
sive demands upon certain of its members (both male and fe­
male) it is crucial that we do not obliterate the most 
natural social grouping and with it the perception of social 
relationships as integral to individual identity. Should 
our idea of the family succumb to the antisocial insistence 
that the individual's freedom is defined by the absence of 
social ties and obligations, it is my contention that the 
experience of individual human freedom itself will no longer 
be a real possibility.
To the extent that we have accepted the idea of social 
existence as a self-imposed restriction of original rights 
and freedoms, it is difficult for us to make sense of the idea 
of any natural and necessary relationship which would shift 
the emphasis from the single individual to two or more indi­
viduals determined to succeed in a cooperative effort. It 
is a most significant reflection of the misunderstood nature 
of a communal experience that we tend to identify the family 
with the legal "possession" of another person and miscellane­
ous accompanying (physical) property. But this misperception, 
or blindness, with respect to the family, is the result of a 
specific historical development in which the reduction of the 
extended family to the present nuclear family is blatantly
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paralleled by the development of political,economic,social, 
and psychological egoism.
Today the family's foundational relationship to 
human society has been put into question by the capacity of 
modern technological society to substitute disparate and 
fragmented institutional experiences for the myriad of de­
velopmental experiences which occur with spontaneity in the 
organically unified family. By allowing institutions to move 
into the vacuum of parental authority and by allowing the 
real material expression of a unified human will to atrophy,
I believe we tacitly agree to an appropriation of the means 
for the realization of human being. We have a precedent for 
this particular form of appropriation of humanity in our 
American history. The monstrous system of black slavery re­
quired, as a part of its violent foundation, the complete 
violation of the black family and social structure. Indeed, 
while the circumstances may be historically altered, the 
horrors of both slavery and the slave mentality are, I be­
lieve, the very real implications of the total disappearance 
of the family.
My first paper sought to understand Hegel's provoca­
tive idea of the universality of the family. My second 
paper attempts to demonstrate that all features of human 
being can only be realized in dialectical human interaction. 
My third paper must now move towards a theory of the family 
which will incorporate the essential dialectic of human
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being in an experience of genuine universality. It is my 
intention to show that the family may be understood as a 
social institution with the potential for revolutionary 
praxis, because its essential nature as defined by Hegel is 
also the essence of human solidarity.
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FREEDOM IN NAME ALONE
We live today in a society whose ultimate justifica­
tion is the protection of individual rights and freedoms but 
which is distinctively marked at the subjective level by the 
pervasive doubt that a meaningful identity is even possible. 
While the contradiction, whether recognized or unrecognized, 
is the source of an intense frustration and anxiety, particu­
larly when ignited by the pressures to achieve self-reliance 
and individual efficacy, the doubt itself drives the ma­
chinery of open-ended, irrational consumption. The concept 
of individuality abstracted from the material circumstances 
which are its only real foundation, has become the expression 
of a raw dissatisfaction with what appears to be the primary 
limitation upon personal activity: financial incapacitation 
and/or productive inadequacy. But the network of social- 
economic-political relationships has as little interest in 
promoting the development of genuine human individuality as
General Motors has in producing a car that will last beyond
the guarantee, for it is the desperate belief that identity
and uniqueness can be bought that sustains the solid mass
of consumers who can be talked into buying anything.
It is only in the context which expects, appreciates, 
and sponsors individuality that the concept of individual 
freedom can be prevented from disappearing behind its
6
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ideological formulation as a kind of self-evident condition 
to which human beings somehow "naturally” aspire. As indi­
viduals find themselves increasingly losing any clear sense 
of self (as evidenced by the phenomenal sales of "Do-It- 
Yourself Self-Repair" books) our society displays an in­
creasingly authoritarian control of the possibilities of 
human growth. The contradiction is most apparent in the 
clash of the premium placed on the opportunities for personal 
development with the discredited notions of meaning and pur­
pose. The prevalent sense of "purpose" today is, by and 
large, a concept of personal success as measured by the es­
tablished and immediate categories of money and power. A 
position of power and authority in the economic-political 
structure of society delivers a field of practical affairs 
whose manipulation and management can, in the absence of a 
critical perception of their artificial character, describe 
a particular individual by identifying his functions. At 
the same time a deliberate attempt to express the humanistic 
response to those same practical affairs can be used as a 
proof of "independent" thought depending upon the current 
receptivity towards a manipulation of the "abstract" con­
cepts of humanity, nature, and ideological noninterference. 
Both approaches are characterized by an attempt to appro­
priate an identity by assuming the attitude and posture which 
links one to a particular social function.
To the extent that such a function is stabilized by
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8
practices and institutions that are beyond the direct influ­
ence of the individual it is the requirements of the position 
which determine the relationships being actively carried out 
by the individual whose personality absorbs and embodies the 
particular function. Responding as a particular "point of 
view" or interest, whose actual existence is regarded 
as proof of the social capacity to tolerate personal
difference, the individual cannot transcend the perspective 
of the position he occupies without resigning the attendant 
distinction it confers upon him for the "position" itself is 
structurally unable to grow. The personal distinction he 
enjoys as he gives life to the nonliving but rational institu­
tionalization of human debate is a costume at base, appro­
priate to a certain set of circumstances, a certain staging 
and no other, insofar as the authority with which one is 
able to direct or analyze the events of one time and space 
is a derivation of the established structure of social pro­
cesses .
An expanse of human possibility which can only become 
a part of the human experience through individual becoming 
remains unexplored and thus unrealized. The extent to which 
the capacity to scan one's personal horizon of possibilities 
is diverted into the systematically encouraged emphasis upon 
the rights of an empty individuality is the measure of our 
loss of personal freedom for it is the evidence of the shallow­
ness with which human potential is perceived. When the theory
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of individual freedom is excused from the responsibility of 
facilitating the realization of human difference, whether on 
the grounds that toleration is sufficient or that toleration 
exhausts the proper range of social involvement, the theory 
is severed from its true ground, the concrete processes of 
human becoming. Individuality, as a concept, as an ideal, 
and as a genuine human need, is first reduced to an equiva­
lency with general human activities and then is gutted.
Instead of invoking the wonder of infinite human potential 
the word itself is used only when the implications of quali­
tative human difference can be ignored: When the prospect 
of individual expression harbors no real surprise vis-a-vis 
the established order of things.
THE MEANING OF "INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM"
In his essay "Democratic Theory: Ontology and Tech­
nology," C. B. Macpherson develops the argument that Western 
democracy, as distinct from the communist theory of democ­
racy or populist democracy, ". . .is for market society. . ."^ 
The emphasis upon individual freedom of choice which struc­
tures Western democratic theory, he argues, significantly ex­
ceeds the right to a choice between political parties. The 
individual's right to free choice in Western theory includes 
the rights to a choice concerning the use of one's income, 
one's capital, and one's skills and energy. On the other 
hand, the liberal market system (capitalist economics)
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requires that one enter voluntary contractual exchanges of 
one's person and/or property which ultimately violate the 
individual's right of autonomy. But the premise that the 
human individual is fundamentally motivated by the rational 
desire to maximize his utilities, both as material goods 
and as (relatively) immaterial pleasures, provides a theo­
retical justification for an economic system which must 
force the individual into a position that denies self- 
direction and a functional reconciliation with the principle 
of the absolute priority of individual autonomy. Further­
more, Macpherson argues, it was necessary that an incentive 
to continuous exertion on the part of the individual be 
institutionalized insofar as the traditional, feudal obliga­
tion to work was defused by capitalist market arrangements.
That incentive was achieved with the ideological entrench­
ment of the concept of a right of unlimited individual appro­
priation which found its moral justification in the new postu­
late of human nature peculiar to modern liberal market society,
viz. that it is man's nature to seek satisfaction of unlimited
2desires both innate and acquired.
For Macpherson this ontological assumption declares 
a degree of individualism that is still the ideological 
foundation of our system of production insofar as that system 
relies upon market incentives, and it is clearly the case that 
the picture of unrestricted appropriation exerts tremendous 
appeal for the majority of citizens who share the conceptual
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constructs of Western democratic theory. But while Macpher­
son argues that the concept of man as infinite consumer is 
incompatible with an equally forceful postulate of Western 
democratic theory, the concept of every man's right to 
"maximize," or make the most of his individual human powers, 
he does not undertake a critique of the tenuous association 
of individuality, or self-maximization, with the privatized 
market activity of individual appropriation and consumption.
He recognizes that the right of unlimited appropriation 
undermines the universal right of self-realization throughout 
Western market society, but he calls for the rejection of the 
market concept of man's essence, i.e., the postulate of man's 
essence as infinite consumer and infinite antagonist of 
scarcity.^ The original problem of drawing men into the 
productive process has been replaced today, he suggests, by 
the problem of providing alternative outlets for the human 
energy that was previously expended in labor. Ultimately, 
Macpherson implies that the promise of the technological 
revolution lies in its capacity to provide universal maximi­
zation of individual powers through the established channels 
of market activity and, consequently, by means of the modern 
psychological phenomenon of individual dependence upon com­
modity exchange.
Macpherson's argument thus conforms to the traditional 
democratic theorist's assumption of the existence of human
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individuality itself and remains committed to the ideal of 
the preservation and guarantee of individual rights by means 
of a liberal market economy. In this sense human individual­
ity is understood as an automatic by-product of the physical 
separateness of human beings, a matter of their disparate 
centers of physical need and mental perspective which are 
unalterably bound "inside" the perimeters of the physical 
body. There appears to be no need to call the criteria of 
individuality into question from this point of view because 
conformity is only the result of external forces, specifi­
cally the restriction of personal freedom.
According to this empirical definition of individual­
ity, the least imposition of rules and regulations governing 
the activities of the individual that is possible within 
the social circumstance becomes the concrete expression of 
individual freedom. Concurrently the concept of genuine 
human difference is steadily removed into the range of its 
politically divisive connotations: conflict, opposition, and 
competitive struggle. Individuality in these terms is the 
aspect of everyone's social existence which is threatened by 
one's existence as a part of a group and which is most vul­
nerable to violation from social engagement. Given this 
understanding, the suggestion that it is the lack of social 
engagement which most endangers the real existence of the 
individual appears to be the assertion that the social struc­
ture within which one lives ought to be given priority over
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the individual. And in the age of modern democracy a con­
ferral of normative priority upon any framework of social 
organization which can be understood as a (or the) state 
is in no uncertain terms a declaration of the institutional 
denial of individual freedom and autonomy.
To the extent that individual freedom is defined 
as the absence of the influence of external pressures upon 
individual thought and action the common concept of totali^ 
tarianism is the coerced submission to commands and authori­
tarian directives which issue from the higher levels of a 
hierarchically arranged governmental structure. Indeed, 
structural totalitarianism epitomizes the violation of indi­
viduality because it discards the significance of the individ­
ual moral conscience in practical and ethical decision-making 
and denies the right of the individual to self-determination. 
But because the concept thus derives from a quantitative 
analysis of the rights and liberties withheld by the state, 
the dimension of individual oppression which can occur with­
out the presence of officers who give orders,enforcement 
squadrons to back them up, or the existence of such wretched 
living circumstances as would force an otherwise proud in­
dividual into the attitude of a slave remain hidden.
The concept of totalitarianism may imply individual 
oppression, but when that oppression is wholly understood as 
a matter of legal concerns and political structure the need
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to establish the reality of human individuation in order to 
defend it is forgotten. Instead, it seems enough if one's 
sociopolitical situation is such that, should the occasion 
arise in which one's dissent is evoked, dissent is theo­
retically conceivable in terms of one's political, i.e., 
ideological, freedom to disagree. Dissent, resistance, and 
even autonomy are human capacities which it is understood 
can only be protected from the possibility of manipulation 
by being totally excluded from the range of public respon­
sibility. But no indictment of the strength and resilience 
of the particular will is more clear than that which is re­
vealed by the demand for so complete an insulation of the 
particular will from external (nonpersonal) influence that 
ethical dialogue and debate rarely escape what are by now 
the platitudes of relativism. The necessity of protecting 
the single individual from the arbitrary exercise of 
authority through force cannot be allowed to create an 
acquiescence to the principled ignorance of the fragility 
of genuine human individuality because to acquiesce in the 
reification of the concept is to quicken the totalitarian 
implications of a society which tolerates dissent because 
there is none.
THE PROMISE OF THE GROUP; INDIVIDUALITY
In order to be meaningful the concept of individual 
freedom must be grounded in the experience of oneself as a
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being who constitutes an aspect of the group that is only 
actualized by means of one's real particular existence. The 
isolated or alienated individual who lives with no conscious 
relation to any group except a vague regional or national 
identification is deprived of the means for developing a con­
crete expression of his own distinctiveness. For while the 
social individual is able to clarify and refine his particular 
talents by relying upon the collective activity of the group, 
the isolated or alienated person must face the whole range of 
his needs and wants alone. The capacity to meet the imperative 
of production and reproduction requisite for the maintenance 
of life is not in itself a sufficient condition for the reali­
zation of one's human being, i.e., for unique self-development. 
The human organization or definition of work is crucial to the 
concretization of the possibilities for the human objectifica­
tion which the production process should provide insofar as 
the mechanization of any human activity locks the individual 
into his particular task as a nonthinking part of a whole which 
is externally orchestrated. In this sense the assembly-line 
wage earner and the aspiring "self-sufficient" refugee from 
the wage labor system share the alienated consciousness of 
workers for whom there is no alternative to routine and repe­
titious labor. For those who escape direct participation in 
the dehumanized process of production, as well as for those 
who do not, there is no perception of the violation of human 
rights inherent in the exclusive atomistic approach to the
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satisfaction of human need.
The repression of the possibilities for genuinely 
human development intrinsic to the processes of production 
is reinforced and amplified with the identification of 
’human individual' and undifferentiated (abstract) 'con­
sumer*. As a systematic feature of modern bourgeois society, 
isolated market activity has become the major focus of human 
interaction because the fixed nature of market exchange ap­
pears to be the best, if not the only, guarantee of freedom 
for individual taste and inclination. At the present stage 
of monopoly capitalism the array of commodities must be 
recognized as at least a psychological placebo which although 
impotent in terms of real individual development, somehow 
manages to sedate the vital human drive for self-actualization, 
Thus the pleasing availability and accessibility of goods 
(and services) which promise both instant gratification of 
desire and the most rapid execution of any given endeavor 
possible binds human creativity. The suggestion that the 
necessary processes of objectification, i.e., the spatial, 
temporal realization of the self in the world, can be a mat­
ter of "good business" constricts the possibilities for human 
becoming by replacing the ideal of human excellence with the 
type of market omnipotence.
When the twenty-four hours of a typical citizen's 
day in modern technological-industrial society are accounted 
for, it is clear that cooperative, collective human endeavor
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is attacked on two fronts: First, in our place and time of
employment by the pervasive alienation of the laborer, and 
then in our place and time of "personal life" by the pallia­
tive of consumption. As it becomes more and more difficult 
to escape the glitter of the aggregated market array, it is 
proportionately more and more difficult to engage directly 
with other human beings, despite the increasing proportion 
of "free" time, i.e., time not absolutely required by pro­
ductive labor, in which to do so. The direct relation be­
tween the increasing potential for individual freedom and 
the increasingly collective character of production must be 
dismissed by the understanding which grounds individual free­
dom in the opposition of private being and economic activity 
(both production and consumption). By denying the fact and 
the necessity of continuity in human endeavor, the mythically 
fragmented character of economic activity has become the 
standard by which all human relationships, all processes of 
human objectification, are understood. Thus the individual's 
"freedom" is his "right" to acquire and dispose of both 
property and personal relationships at will.
To the extent that the family provides the structure 
for and the justification of a commitment to other individ­
uals which spontaneously takes priority over personal impulse 
and even personal need, the family realizes an essential 
feature of subversive, i.e., revolutionarily free, society. 
But it is only when such a commitment is made eagerly and
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almost unconsciously as a natural striving of the self towards 
its own fulfillment that the family presents the genuinely 
social experience, the perception of others as essential to 
individual being. When family commitment is expressed in 
terms of self-sacrifice, defined as a duty, and treated as 
a "proof" of moral conscience the family itself must at base 
represent the perceived limits to personal growth because it 
is ultimately understood only as a responsibility, i.e., a 
burden, undertaken out of deference to social custom. And 
to the degree that the most elementary experience of social 
human life is appropriated as an institution of a particular 
social-economic order, the experience ceases to be the means 
for human development and appears instead as a source of 
human oppression.
THE FAMILY AS THE STARTING POINT
When Aristotle undertook the project of analyzing 
man’s political being he began with an analysis of the family. 
While the central task of his Politics is the identification 
and definition of the state or political community which aims 
at the "highest" good, Aristotle’s method requires that the 
first book of the Politics be given over to a study of the 
family and its constitutive parts: the household economy,
the slave property, children, and wives. "As in other depart­
ments of science, so in politics, the compound should always 
be resolved into the simple elements or least parts of the
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w h o l e , h e  writes, indicating that to approach the concept 
of the state without investigating its origins would be to 
deny the most basic elements of political association and 
thereby invite the represssion of those basic human rela­
tionships.
Aristotle's contention is that the state naturally 
precedes both the family and the individual because the 
"whole is of necessity prior to the part"^ and because the 
individual is radically dependent upon the state, but it is 
family relationships which he finds fundamentally determina­
tive with respect to political relationships. Not only are 
they analogous, as in the comparison of the king's relation­
ship to his subjects with the paternal relationship of 
father to son, but family relationships also imply the kinds 
of political relationships which define the community. Thus 
Aristotle advises the education of women and children be 
"trained with an eye to the constitution" because most of 
these individuals are or will become citizens.^ To the extent 
that every individual begins his life in a state of dependency 
upon the limited community of the family, Aristotle recognized 
the family experience as the archetypical process of human 
intercourse. Aristotle was the first of many social theorists 
in the Western tradition to suggest that the family is the 
active model of political existence insofar as it initiates 
every individual citizen into an increasingly broad and more 
complex network of dependency relationships that ultimately 
define human community. Aristotle, however, did not question
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the nature of those relationships.
Nearly 2,000 years later, J. J. Rousseau began his 
analysis of political society with the assertion that the
7family is the primitive model of political societies. For 
Rousseau it is specifically the father%s care for his chil­
dren as it compares to the task of governing the citizens 
of the state which marks the important connection between 
the family and the state for it is his sense that the 
existence of both kinds of societies is grounded in the 
need of their members for that society. The natural "physi­
cal" family comes into being only when the preservation of 
the children requires it and disintegrates when they are 
grown. Similarly, the association of individuals in the 
body politic (state) is fundamentally the result of man's 
inability to preserve himself as an isolated individual in 
the "State of Nature." Rousseau's concept of the social 
contract rests as much on the principle of voluntarily sub­
mitting to a supreme authority in order to further one's 
self-interest as did the Hobbesian scheme, insofar as the 
"General Will" is endowed with the authority to act in the 
best interests of the citizens. But for Rousseau that 
authority is as subject to critical evaluation and judg­
ment as we commonly believe the exercise of paternal author­
ity in the family is today, for it is only in order to pro­
tect and further the common good that Rousseau suggests the 
centralization of political authority. Thus it is only to
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the extent that the benefit of the governed is realized that 
human authority, political or paternal, is justified. 
Rousseau's analysis of the basic meaning of social organiza­
tion takes advantage of the family's immediate involvement 
with the health of its members in such a way as to render the 
concept of authority into a concept of practical human 
strength.
With Hegel's identification of the family as the 
source of the state's ethical being the concept of this pri­
mary human community is linked not simply to the necessity of 
human cooperation but to the fundamental possibility of moral 
human life. The substance of the family in Hegel's analysis 
is expressed in the common interest and common identity of 
all of the family's members as a whole and to the extent that 
the family constitutes a moment of universality which each 
individual recognizes his particular interest only in terms 
of the interest of the whole, the family's actions have an 
ethical character. Hegel's concept of ethical human being 
thus begins not in the range of personal commitments and 
judgments but rather with the subjective experience of the 
significance of the welfare and "happiness," broadly speak­
ing, of others. According to the Hegelian dialectic it is 
out of the consciousness of oneself as a being who transcends 
his individuality that the true nature of morality arises, 
i.e., the appreciation of every subjective expression of 
being as an expression of the necessary and genuinely free
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(Universal Spirit) and the consequent recognition of the ir­
reducible value of every individual as an essential aspect 
of the necessary, objective Being.
It is clear that, despite its decidedly nonpublic 
character, the concept of the family has occupied an impor­
tant place in social-political theory from the earliest 
efforts to analyze human society. Even as the actual family 
in American society loses its grip upon the individual, the 
concept of the family still contributes significantly as a 
model of social human relations to the continuing efforts to 
understand the nature of the individual’s integration into 
the social whole. In a recently published article, "Marx, 
Sex, and the Transformation of Society," Virginia Held sug­
gests that Marx’s statement of the definitive nature of the 
man-woman relationship (’’, . . the relation of man to woman 
is the most natural relation of human being to human being. 
It therefore reveals the extent to which man’s natural be-
ohavior has become human. . . . ’’) is a possible model for 
the development of human relationships which will be able to 
transcend the bourgeois tenet of self-interest and mutual 
use by individuals of one another to their own advantage.
Held argues that Marx’s conception of the man-woman 
relationship as the sensuous manifestation, the observable 
fact of the extent to which the human essence has become 
nature to man, can profitably direct both our reflective 
understanding of and our concretely present search for the
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genuinely cooperative society. The strength of this argu­
ment, it seems to me, lies in the reality of our knowledge 
of and engagement in relationships which are specifically 
characterized by a true mutuality of concern and respect 
for other human beings, for it is the experience of a self­
transcendent concern and love for human being which sig^ 
nificantly challenges the bourgeois definition of man as a 
grasping, infinitely desirous, egotistical, center of wants 
and needs. Held goes on to suggest that to the extent that 
the man-woman relationship can defy the asocial imperatives 
of bourgeois consciousness it might profitably be studied 
as a key to the nature of sound alternatives to the concept 
of community which assumes a natural antagonism between any 
two individuals.
Furthermore, we can observe that the social and 
political theory most in need of development, and 
probably of greatest interest in recent years, is 
the theory of community. An understanding of the 
relation between man and woman has not yet really 
begun to be tapped for insights into conceptions 
of community, though it is probably the most fruit­
ful source of insight for such conceptions, and for 
discovering whatever it is that lies deepest at the 
heart of society.9
It is my contention that while the man-woman relationship 
does manifest at least the potential for a radically alterna­
tive approach to human relations in general, that potential 
is stunted and repressed by the imposition of restrictive 
family forms (most commonly patriarchal family structures) 
upon it. An equally grave threat however, to the realization
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of that potential is inherent in the modern devaluation of 
family life and commitments, for the expansion of atomistic 
self-perception can only be at the expense of what sense of 
collectivity and mutuality we still possess.
THE FAMILY AS TOTALITARIAN: HORKHEIMER'S
CATEGORY OF AUTHORITY
In his essay "Authority and the Family," Max Hork- 
heimer argues that authority is a central category for his­
tory insofar as men's personalities, their "drives and 
passions, their characteristic dispositions and reaction 
patterns," are shaped by and reflect the power-relationships 
which define the social life-process of their particular 
time.
Over the whole time-span embraced by historical 
writing, men have worked in more or less willing 
obedience to command direction. . . . Because the 
activity which kept society alive and in the 
accomplishment of which men were therefore molded 
occurred in submission to an external power, all 
relationships and patterns of reaction stood under 
the sign of authority.10
Although the bourgeois revolution began as the 
struggle against the authority of tradition and the estab­
lished social hierarchy, Horkheimer contends that authority- 
motivated behavior and authority-based thinking were far 
from outmoded. The rise of bourgeois individualism cen­
tered around the demand for freedom from the old bonds of 
feudal relationships of dependence which were becoming
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increasingly untenable as the feudal mode of production 
failed to meet the needs of an increasing population and 
civil and ecclesiastical bureaucracies became unable to deal 
with an increasingly complex society. However, the bourgeois 
revolution introduced not only a new authority but new forms 
of dependency relationships upon that authority as well, 
viz. the dependence of both producer and consumer upon mar­
ket activity as dictated by the reified authority of the 
economy which is both immune to and alien from the influence 
of men's collective and conscious direction.
Instead of treating submission to economic circum­
stances as a part of one's dependency upon socially estab­
lished authoritarian relationships bourgeois philosophy 
sought to ground the inevitable dependence of the individual 
upon his social context in natural circumstances and to pre­
sent the justification of that dependence as insight into
11eternal matters of fact. Obedience and submission to the 
needs of the established structure of social production 
could no longer be compelled by the imperative of maintain­
ing a proper relationship to God once the link between 
earthly social-political order and God's purposes was broken. 
For bourgeois consciousness authority became ". . . not even
a relationship but an inalienable property of the superior
12being, a qualitative difference." The rational, self- 
sufficient man, who is the paradigm of bourgeois conscious­
ness, voluntarily adapts to natural authority of economic
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necessity and its attendant class divisions and property sys­
tems out of rational self-interest.
Here then, is a philosophical system in which the 
individual is conceived, not in his involvement 
with society and nature, but abstractly and as a 
purely intellectual essence, a being which must 
now think of the world and acknowledge it as an 
eternal principle and perhaps as the expression 
of his own true b e ing.l3
The patriarchal family is the fundamental social in­
stitution by means of which the individual is habituated to 
the authority relationships of bourgeois society, Horkheimer 
suggests. Both the father’s natural strength and his capac­
ity to earn and/or possess all of the family’s money repre­
sent natural facts against which children must not rebel and 
for which they must have esteem. "In consequence of the 
seeming naturalness of paternal power . . . growing up in 
the restricted family is a first-rate schooling in the 
authority behavior specific to this s o c i e t y . W h e n  as an 
adult the individual finds himself subject to the authority 
of the social network of economic relationships and without 
any means of redress of appeal, any perception of the contra­
diction of his theoretical sovereignty and freedom as a 
rational being is occluded by his familiarity with the neces­
sity of accepting social circumstances as they are and 
"adapting" to reality. The child’s dependence upon the 
patriarchal, restricted family smoothly translates into the 
adult’s dependence upon the amorphous and alien economic 
system of bourgeois society insofar as both group forms
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repress communal reflection and decision and amplify the
perception of so-called "natural," i.e., reified authority.
For the formation of the authority-oriented char­
acter it is especially decisive that the children 
should learn, under pressure from the father, not 
to trace every failure back to its social causes 
but to remain at the level of the individual and 
to hypostatize the failure in religious terms as 
sins or in naturalistic terms as deficient natural 
endowment.15
Horkheimer's critique of the traditional patriarchal 
family presents an exceptionally clear analysis of the 
appropriation of the means for human intercourse and develop­
ment by particular economic interests. To the extent that 
the situation of human intimacy and mutual concern is struc­
tured by rigid domination-servitude relationships it is clear 
that the unique potential of both child and adult is denied. 
But if Horkheimer's argument that authority is a basic his­
torical category is accepted it is also clear that the family 
cannot be disassociated from the exercise of authority simply 
by the recognition that traditional paternal authority is 
largely arbitrary. At the practical level of production in 
response to material need the processes of organizing, di­
recting, and focusing the collective capacities of men will 
always require that some authority be exercised and obeyed 
if that capacity is to be most profitably exploited. Al­
though the family today is rarely the productive economic 
unit it once was, the division of labor and various delega­
tions of responsibility which still occur demonstrate a
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recognition of the authority of the source of that organiza­
tion and decision-making which stabilizes the family around 
its own particular structure. And despite its innovative 
appearance, the mere substitution of the woman for the man, 
or a maternal for a paternal figure of authority, is only 
incidentally effective in retrenching the family's function 
of instilling an "authoritarian consciousness" in its mem­
bers when the ultimate responsibility for the family's 
business and welfare is understood as a form of dictatorial 
license. More importantly, however, the unalterable and un­
deniable dependence of the family's children upon the strength 
and competency of its adults is a small scale model of the 
necessary dependence of all individuals upon others with 
greater experience, resources, or ability. In this sense, 
to refuse to recognize the authority of another's competence 
or understanding is to pursue a self-destructive kind of 
"independence."
The vacuum created by ignoring the need for an es­
tablished means of reaching an ultimate decision or of con­
solidating a collective effort is all too quickly filled by 
the anonymous authority of impersonal economic interests.
While the perpetuation of the traditional relationships of 
authority within the family is, as Horkheimer suggests, the 
perpetuation of a repressive conditioning for assimilation 
into an alienated work force, the refusal to recognize that 
human life and growth is inevitably structured by the
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exercise of authority creates a situation in which individ­
uals are no more capable of self-direction than when self- 
direction is deliberately denied. In the absence of long- 
range planning, firm decisions, and a reliable source of 
judgment individual freedom is lost to the confusion of 
immediate appeal and impulse which ultimately denies the 
capacity to choose by obstructing the experience of genuine 
choice. To the extent that autonomy depends upon rational 
thought and choice it is clear that the necessary exercise 
of authority must be such that individual thought and action 
is encouraged and yet focused upon those interests that are 
genuinely universal. Therefore the struggle to reclaim the 
family for the individual is inseparable from the struggle 
for self-government and autonomy. The tradition of repre­
sentative democracy would seem to demonstrate that an appeal 
to participatory government is neither radical nor innova­
tive, but it is not the procedures of debate and compromise 
that are most significantly in question with respect to the 
family's structure. Rather it is the determination to bring 
the facts and circumstances of one's life within the range 
of human control by means of a conscious recognition of and 
understanding of collective interdependence and productivity 
which must direct the exercise of authority. Thus in order 
to undermine and abolish the formation of the authority- 
oriented character which is incapable of understanding or 
even assessing its social situation and which is locked into
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a privatized individualism that prevents any possible over­
coming of "natural" facts, it is crucial that the family 
provide an experience of collective learning, consideration, 
calculation, and decision-making; i.e., an experience in 
which the actions of the group are authorized by a single 
voice that is spoken by all.
THE FAMILY AS A COLLECTIVE
In order to exist the family must be able to command 
from its members a recognition of and a commitment to its 
independent being. This means, however, that each individual 
member must find himself addressed in another entity (the 
group) for which he is a necessary but never a sufficient 
condition. When the family must impose such a commitment 
upon the individuals of whom it consists, an imposition in 
which the family is particularly successful, the family 
exists as a social institution that has broken with its human 
content and no longer represents a structure in which the 
continuing process of human development is focused and fos­
tered. If any individual who is counted as one of the fam­
ily's members in terms of his contribution to the family's 
working or playing activities and in terms of his dependence 
upon the family's resources is at the same time excluded from 
the concept of the family as only one of an assortment of 
particular beings who have been collected under its familial 
rubric, the family itself is dead. While the institutional
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structure may continue to function within the system of social 
and economic relationships as the administrative agency most 
directly concerned with distribution and reproduction, the 
"family" that must return to an identification of the tradi­
tional or empirical connections between its members in order 
to demonstrate its coherence only succeeds in demonstrating 
the alienation of those individuals from that which is essen­
tially theirs.
1. Form versus Content
The picture of two or three generations of biologi­
cally related persons living together is one of the more rare 
instances of family life in modern society. We have not, 
however, abandoned the concept of the family to the archives 
of outmoded customs but rather seem to be seeking to give it 
a new and historically more appropriate application. To the 
extent that we can no longer rely on the external form to 
identify the family, i.e., the presence of hetero-sexual 
parents, children, grandparents, and assorted "kin," we 
must reconsider the relationships existing between individuals 
who are living together in a shared situation under shared 
circumstances. When familial traits must be acknowledged in 
a group, e.g., a sense of some degree of mutual responsibility 
for one another's welfare and a desire to consider every mem­
ber of the group when a decision is made, the group has a 
legitimate claim to the identity of a family.
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Furthermore, the criterion of family substance must 
refer to the emotional relationships which bind particular 
individuals together. Thus a legally recognized relation­
ship, e.g., marriage or the parent-child relationship, may 
prove to be much less substantial as a family relationship 
than one which is wholly based in a nonlegal commitment.
Our concern for the family as a fundamentally human rela­
tionship cannot be anachronistically limited to an asso­
ciation of individuals who share a common genetic heritage 
for two reasons: First, because to do so would be to deny
the historical movement from the sense of the primacy of 
the biological relationships to the contemporary sense that 
the biological relationship may be less meaningful, if not 
meaningless, in comparison with all newly possible human 
contacts. Secondly, as a result of the realization that 
one is not limited to the society of one's traditional fam­
ily, the individual is presented with the possibility of 
moving beyond the merely formal or legalistic family rela­
tionships on which he would have been so acutely dependent 
in the past. While this freedom of movement threatens the 
traditional concepts of family cohesion and family commit­
ment, it is nevertheless the source of the possibility for 
a genuinely human family. Without the freedom to move out 
of cruel, or stultifying, or simply unsatisfactory relation­
ships individuals were locked into a structure of interper­
sonal relationships which were frequently shaped by a sense
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of the unquestionable "rightfulness” of authoritarianism or 
the inevitability of being "claimed" by some social group in 
a random fashion.
Traditionally, the family into which one is born 
represents the primary "given" in an individual’s life, the 
condition and fact of his existence that predates his ability 
to accept or reject or change such conditions as will exert 
a considerable influence upon his own being. The extent to 
which the notion of rational deliberation seems inappropriate 
to an identification of families and how they are formed re­
flects the special, almost a priori status that must be 
allowed the family as a biological or legal entity insofar 
as the family in these terms cannot be recognized as an ob­
ject of rational consideration. Instead the family which 
understands its own identity as essentially the material prod­
uct of actual human reproduction, or the intent to reproduce, 
epitomizes the experience of what amounts to an arbitrary sub­
ordination of the individual to a social structure.
2. The Human Development of Individuality
Since the notion of social interdependence confuses 
the picture of a self-reliant individual who need not com­
promise his impulses or desires, the working model for social 
relationships in civil society has become that structure of 
efficiency and human indifference which best seems to guar­
antee fair and sufficient distribution of the social product
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without interfering in the individual's personal life. Against 
the antagonistic character of the activity by which one par­
ticipates in "productive" society, the family stands as an 
experience of group participation which assumes not only the 
right but the responsibility to penetrate the dimensions of 
"personal" concerns such as emotional health, ambitions, and 
even one's moral codes and standards. Clearly this level of 
involvement subjects the individual family member to a greater 
or lesser degree of psychological domination, perhaps rein­
forced with physical domination, that openly seeks to prevent 
the individual from behavior that is simply the acting out 
of his innate and "unpolluted" proclivities. Nor is this 
"interference" with the individual's behavior and conscious­
ness limited to the children of the family who seem most 
legitimately subject to adult guidance and training, for the 
family experience necessarily includes all of its members in 
the actualization of the values, and beliefs, by which it 
knows itself as a particular group. Without the active expres­
sion of individuality consciously attempting to implement the 
principles of a specific behavior the group has no substan­
tiality either as a cohesive association or as the social unit 
which counters and ameliorates the deliberate indifference of 
civil society towards the essentially human dimension of life, 
i.e., towards both the spiritual, ethical, aesthetic dimen­
sions of the individual and his reflective understanding of 
these dimensions.
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Thus to the extent that the "personal" realm of be­
lief and value is the stuff (content) of human intercourse 
within the family the inevitably direct and personal engage­
ment of individual family members with one another simul­
taneously makes the existence of genuinely human value a real 
possibility and opens the door to an arbitrary control and 
manipulation of that human value. In this sense the capacity 
of the family to override the independent integrity of its 
members by means of an authoritarian disregard for individ­
uality eludes the simplistic either/or disjunction. To in­
sist that the level of immediate interaction which charac­
terizes family relationships should be transposed from the 
limited and therefore personalized context of a family group 
to the extended and impersonal context of civil society in 
general is to ignore the necessary conditions of a relation­
ship which can engage individuality without controlling it.
At the same time, the restriction of relationships which seek 
out and express, and consequently develop, not only the 
unique aspects of one's being but also the means of dis­
tinguishing between autonomy and heteronomy (or decision and 
suggestion) is to mistake the accidental arbitration of 
human association (i.e., the biological or legal definition 
of family) for the truly necessary mediation of all human 
being.
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3. The Group as Sponsor
Through its multitude of forms and adaptations the 
family (as a concept) epitomizes the experience of human con^ 
cern for others. Regardless of how many people a particular 
family includes or what their actual blood relationship to 
one another is, the mark of their specifically familial unity 
is a more or less constant perception of one another as beings 
whose presence or absence is of utmost significance. Each 
individual member of the family makes a unique contribution 
to the identity of his family by standing apart from his "rela­
tives" as an individual who is known in terms of his specific 
personality and potential. He stands out as a particular ex­
pression of the being of the whole which no other family mem­
ber is capable of expressing. He is, in a very literal 
sense, an irreplaceable element of the family group for his 
personality, i.e., his individual nature, is not simply 
acknowledged to be only his alone but is specifically valued 
by the group as a manifestation of the diversity and real 
human richness of the group.
To the extent that this individual does enjoy the 
trust and tolerance and support of his family, he experiences 
at a very elementary but psychologically essential level the 
meaning of individual freedom. While he may have little or 
no understanding of the legal significance of individual 
rights, the family's recognition of and esteem for his dis­
tinct, personal being must suggest the real basis of
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individual development and being, i.e,, the freedom to 
actualize and extend the dimensions of the self in an autono­
mous fashion.
As Marx has described, human beings who are totally 
submerged in the crude and brutal struggle to meet their 
physical needs do not have the specifically human capacity 
to draw the sensual and intellectual distinctions which 
mark human perceptions as profoundly other than animal or 
nonhuman perception. Similarly, human beings who are con­
sumed by the struggle to assert their private claims to the 
products of human society against the same claims of others 
are submerged in the undifferentiated categorization of all 
human being. The abstract articulation of personal rights 
as an elementary ideological premise ultimately acts against 
the realization of individuality by reducing the significant 
aspects of individual being to the concerns of administered 
equality. Thus "individuality" implies the right to be in­
distinguishable from everyone else insofar as everyone has 
the same right to work for the same wages in order to be 
able to afford the same level of market activity which is 
generally assessed as necessary for a "typical" kind of well­
being. Of course, it cannot be forgotten that far too many 
people do not begin to enjoy the typical or standard level 
of well-being, not only outside the United States but inside 
as well. The fact of substandard living conditions and the 
correlative reduction of educational and employment and
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ultimately human opportunities underscores the immediate ur^ 
gency of a quantitative economic distribution of goods and 
services. But it is only within the context of an institu­
tional tendency to dismiss the general, undifferentiated 
claims to the means of human life that the use of the "flat" 
sense of individuality is justified.
THE BETRAYAL: THE FAMILY VERSUS
THE INDIVIDUAL
Whether because of its conceptual proximity to the 
most basic concerns of human existence (food, shelter, re­
production) or because of its status as an absolute given 
against which reason should have no appeal lest the "natural" 
(as distinct from the human and therefore morally fallible) 
order of things be violated, the family thus stands opposed 
to the individual. It is not only the first social group or 
unit to claim him as a dependent but also the first to de­
mand that he represent the specific character and being of 
the group in his individual thoughts and actions. On the 
one hand the individual's family holds the resources which 
are indeed necessary to his being, i.e., it must provide for 
his physical needs in at least a minimal fashion and, for 
better or worse, it inevitably fulfills the classic socializ­
ing functions, transmitting the culture, language, values, 
etc. which enable the individual to participate in human 
society. On the other hand, the delegation of this
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responsibility to the family dictates a relationship of de­
pendency between the individual and the group which can re­
duce the individual to a simple functionary. In this sense 
the family tie no longer simply sustains the individual by 
means of the family's capacity to meet his basic (physio­
logical and psychological) needs and wants, but actually 
generates a submissive consciousness in the individual who 
must find a place within the family "unity" rather than 
create one.
To be sure, this family exhibits the tangible prop­
erties of a group, i.e., the association of two or more 
individuals, a general identity which exceeds that of any 
single individual, etc., but it does so on the basis of an 
ultimately arbitrary or happenstance collectivity. The bio­
logical criteria of family relationships is fundamentally an 
institutionalization of the result of certain actions and 
circumstances over which we have not yet achieved total con­
trol. What modern science and technology have been able to 
accomplish is the deliberate prevention of conception or 
denial of conception (abortion), i.e., the obstruction of 
the normal processes of reproduction which would otherwise 
result in the creation of a new, individual life. But when 
those processes are not obstructed or interfered with, they 
remain as much beyond the control of human rationality and 
planning as they have ever been. Thus the extent to which 
the creation of potential human individuality is still the
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object of human reproduction remains a critical problem for 
the biological definition of the family.
When we respond to an occasion of successful human 
birth with a profound sense of joy and wonder we express 
more than a simple, unqualified delight at the miracle of 
life. Human life in its temporal and finite form is the 
means by which any given set of circumstances can be over­
come, for it is not only subject to the conditions with 
which it shares the character of material reality but also 
possesses the capacity to understand them. Thus far human 
being has retained the capacity to deviate from predictable 
responses, i.e., to sustain an adherence to concepts and 
principles and beliefs in the face of circumstantial and 
situational pressure(s) to deny them, and in so doing has 
persisted in the unfolding of real, existent value. But it 
is only to the extent that individuals can envision the 
situation that ought to be, that a challenge is made to the 
one that is, and that vision, for all its universal applica­
tion, is fundamentally a product of particular perception. 
Similarly it is the unique expression of the artist’s vision 
or the musician’s composition which forms the tangible con­
tribution to the realization of the human capacity for 
aesthetic creation and while it is the understanding of 
universals which inspires that work, it must be carried out 
by individuals. Thus each particular human birth, understood 
as distinctively human, is the occasion of paradigmatic
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renewal for it represents the reality of possible human 
progress and achievement that will always historically ex­
ceed the world as it is.
When individuals are bound to a specific group either 
by virtue of their blood relationships or by relationships 
grounded in a legal commitment their integration into that 
group can reduce to a merely nominal claim of connectedness 
and yet be taken as a kind of "evidence" that one is not 
alone in the world, i.e., as a hedge against the "quiet des­
peration" of alienated individualism. In this sense, bio­
logical and legal ties are understood to be the substantial 
social relationships without which the individual would be 
simply absorbed by the wider society which surrounds him.
To the extent that the social reality is such that only the 
conceptual absence of human confrontation and engagement can 
structure and clarify the notion of individual rights and 
freedoms, this sense of the family arbitrates the apparent 
conflict between the social (i.e., human) needs of the in­
dividual and his life as a "free and equal" citizen.
Historically the presence of mutual concern and love 
between family members appears as a kind of luxury in that 
it was possible and even necessary to maintain the family 
despite their absence. The modern development of the in­
dividual's capacity to live alone marks our era as a period 
in which family relationships are remarkably voluntary.
Which family, if any, the individual will accept as a
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constitutive principle if his life depends upon the rela­
tionship between the demands made upon the individual by 
the group and his own demands with respect to what the fam­
ily is able to provide for him. When the family appears 
as the object of a conflict between the individual’s need 
for the intimacy of family life and his need for personal 
freedom it betrays an unnecessary antagonism between its 
institutional structure and its human "elements."
THE PROMISE OF THE INDIVIDUAL: THE GROUP
Social identity must rest upon the real character of 
a social group as it is manifested in the several particular 
expressions of human being by which it is comprised if it is 
to avoid the totalitarian alternative, viz. the derivation 
of individual identity from the contrived collective repre­
sentation of the state or group. Without the existence of 
the individual the group has only an abstract, though not 
necessarily rational, kind of identity insofar as it is un­
related to the material development of its real being, the 
individual. Profoundly inhuman implications must always 
accompany this authoritarian kind of social identity which 
can be imposed upon any subject in the manner of empty 
categorization as determined by any arbitrarily chosen 
conceptual (i.e., ideological) arrangement.
To the extent that the individual’s significance is 
reduced to his function as representative of and contributor
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to the social identity which both precedes and supercedes 
him, individual development and growth is reduced to the 
exercise of duty and obedience to orders for which the 
superior being and purpose of the group is the only author­
ity. In this situation, the determination to weld a social 
identity out of the available human resource assumes the 
power both to discharge individuality in the name of a 
greater, because collectively stronger, being and to ascer­
tain the essential nature of that collective being without 
reference to its real elements. Thus individuals who acci­
dentally share certain characteristics such as place of 
birth or race are united around a sense of commonality 
which is defined in terms of a deliberately exclusive sense 
of humanity and human potential. The ultimate perversion 
of the collective consciousness of a group experience is 
the denigration of personal moral reflection which not only 
denies the classical definition of the self-directive man 
but also represses the rational perception of genuinely 
universal human relationships, i.e., those which transcend 
the diversity of circumstance without devaluing it.
Any group which assumes the power of conferring the 
substance of one’s identity upon its members as that iden­
tity is defined by the needs of the group demonstrates an 
obliviousness to the means and the value of human being that 
readily facilitates the operation of particular interests.
If the ideology clearly pronounces the futility and absurdity
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o£ individual effort as in a totalitarian or fascist society 
there is no question but that the group, as it is consoli­
dated into a representation of whatever interests find them­
selves able to dominate its endeavors, merely employs human 
being as the means by which the group acts. On the other 
hand, where the ideological articulation of the group's 
nature retains the concept of individuality as a central 
tenet of its own theory, it cannot be automatically under­
stood as a demonstrably significant or real value. But even 
when the idea of individuality is allowed only a superficial 
justificatory function in the conceptual framework of social 
institutions its strength as a fundamental human value mili­
tates against the complete subordination of the individual 
within his society. As long as the social body is at least 
nominally dedicated to the protection of every individual's 
existence as a unique particular it must employ the term 
which has the power to suggest challenge and refusal on the 
part of the individual. While genuine human difference is 
clearly threatened by the recession of its possibilities, 
the emphasis upon the evil of any social tampering with in­
dividual identity and will can sustain a conceptual tension 
between social identity and individual being from which a 
critical attitude towards the demands and values of the group 
may grow. In this sense the democratic premium upon indi­
vidual rights and freedoms is, despite its theoretical ab­
straction and practical emptiness, crucial to the reality of
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an identity which is separate from that of the group and dif­
ferent from that of any other member of the group because it 
demands that the presupposed individual be concretely iden­
tified.
FROM HUMAN INTIMACY TO HUMAN INTERDEPENDENCE
Within the context of a group individual action is 
an embodiment of the interest and purpose of the whole group 
for it reflects the shared resources and possibilities of 
the common situation. But the collective character of that 
act is only its abstract characterization for as an individ­
ual act it underscores the extent to which the collective 
identity of the group is constituted by individuals. That 
the group may, and often does, act as a body does not pre­
clude the independent activity of its diverse members who 
share the circumstances and conditions of their lives but 
not the composition of their souls. Rather it is from the 
foundation of the recognition of their common interests that 
each member's separate identity emerges because it is in 
that recognition that the opportunity for self-realization 
is secured.
Through the recognition of common ends and their 
shared efforts to attain those ends each member can be freed 
from what would be the overwhelming task of production and 
reproduction to meet one's personal needs in much the manner 
of Marx's analysis of the collective character of labor.
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Within the family, however, the collective capacity to pro­
mote individual freedom is not a matter of the expansive 
potential of cooperation in material production but rather 
issues from the concept of the family as the objective struc' 
ture within which subjective human being is able to take its 
individual shape and form. The freedom for individuality 
that is offered by the family thus only begins with the iden­
tification of the family's fundamental purpose with an ade­
quate provision for personal needs. In an epoch marked by 
an increasingly rapid establishment of "public" institutions 
which are not only capable of, but even sometimes better at, 
fulfilling the traditional functions of the family, the 
radical value of the family is its capacity to provide both 
the concept of and the experience of those conditions of 
human intimacy and engagement which are essential to the ex­
pression and development of true human individuality.
But to the extent that the being of the family can 
only exist as the active processes of becoming by means of 
which each individual member becomes himself, the alienation 
of family members is far more than an appropriation of prop­
erty understood in the possessive sense. Rather, the family 
that stands in opposition to its members as an independently 
established entity denies to those individuals the funda­
mental experience of oneself as simultaneously subject and 
object. Until one can understand that he is an essential 
constituent of a social group which appears as "other",
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apart and at a distance from himself, there is little real 
possibility of his assuming responsibility for its actions 
except or until he can claim exclusive leadership. When 
the family appears distinctly other and different the ele­
mentary experience of social human being for the individual 
is so dominated by limitations and restraints, that the con­
cept of social groups cannot escape its influence, not sim­
ply because of the individual's personal fear but most im­
portantly because that paradigm group which should be 
available as a concise and uncluttered model of collective 
work and play is missing. The shallow scientistic understand­
ing of the anthropological conclusion that man is a "gregarious' 
animal is revealed in the experience of even our most intimate 
and basic relationships as a part of an involuntary association 
with others who do not necessarily find our own (subjective) 
interests expressing theirs. The current tendency to push the 
sociologist to a more and more "scientific" accumulation of 
data on human nature and its manipulation by the group increas­
ingly appears to be the only alternative the anarchic anti­
resolutions of the continuing conflict between family respon­
sibilities and personal freedom. But the scientific socio­
logical management of human collectivity will no more be the 
form of either self-determination or self-government than is 
the scientific management of the labor process a means of fa­
cilitating the humanization of social labor.
The prospect of a science of human behavior that could
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dictate the necessary conditions for a stable social order 
has in its favor the capacity to illuminate the circum­
stances in which the individual will relinquish his claim 
to the rights of selftdirection. If such understanding 
could motivate the elimination of social structures which 
incorporate the individual without expressing him it would 
indeed have progressive implications. However, the deter­
mination to manage and control the obstreperous "facts" of 
material existence which pervades the scientific approach 
thus far suggests that our understanding of human behavior 
will be used for systematizing human interaction, particu­
larly in order to guarantee and protect the operation of 
interdependent production lines.
CONTINUITY VERSUS OPPORTUNITY: THE
CONFLICT BETWEEN "ME" AND "WE"
Freedom for individual development must imply both 
the nonchanging essence which develops and the changing 
appearance by which that development is marked, for the 
"freedom" which simply permits an episodic accumulation of 
varied experience is the means through which human individ­
uality is dissipated and spent. Without the binding force 
of a dimension of one’s being that is carried forward into 
each new experience and confronted with the challenge of 
the possibilities peculiar to that experience, the individ­
ual has no resistance against the demands of the new
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
49
situation and must submit to a thorough, internalization of 
the sociological phenomena in each ne>r setting. The vul­
nerability of the rootless individual can be illustrated by 
the common case of accepting employment with a company or 
firm towards which one feels initially at odds. All too 
soon the values and beliefs which would set the individual 
against the very economic activity that offers him a salary 
are forgotten or renounced as the impractical ideals of a 
more naive age. But a parallel dynamic can also be noted 
in the flexible identity of the individual who either pur­
sues or settles for the serial form of interpersonal rela­
tionships. In this case, the cost of preserving his "free­
dom" is not solitude but the lack of a truly distinctive 
life style or character such as would demand an equally 
distinctive companion.
To the extent that the necessity of making such ad­
justments is less noticeable as the opportunities for moving 
freely from one experience to the next without making sig­
nificant commitments to either people or projects increase, 
individuality is already a disappearing aspect of human being 
Thus in the frantic scramble to program excitement, novelty, 
and generally new experience into our lives we tend to find 
the same patterns of relationships and learning recurring 
again and again despite the variation in circumstance. In­
deed, the possibility of growth through experience already 
tends toward a simple resituation and voyeurism insofar as
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the longing for an objective engagement with the world as 
other (in general) is diverted into the temporary pleasures 
of nonparticipatory entertainment.
On the other hand, it is a mistake to suppose that 
the substance of individuality must always be threatened by 
the availability of numerous experiences peculiar to twen­
tieth century technological society, for access to conceptual 
and circumstantial environments beyond that into which one 
is born is as much a prerequisite for the transcendence of 
provincialism as it has ever been. Rather it is the assump­
tion that that access alone is sufficient for the discovery 
and development of one's being, i.e., the assumption that 
it is only the situational features of one's existence which 
are responsible for the promotion or prevention of personal 
growth, which must be critically assessed.
In modern society access to the experience of other 
environments means not simply mobility and communication but 
a devaluation of the bonds which mark an interpersonal rela­
tionship for in order to make use of the technological means 
of travel and change, one must be able to leave one situation 
and enter another. While this devaluation is apparently co- 
existensive with the logic of individual primacy, it is also 
the source of a form of individual oppression against which 
the individual is singularly helpless because his resistance 
appears to be directed against himself. It is not often that 
the individual who chooses to leave his family or "primary"
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group setting and throw himself as much upon his own re­
sources as possible is able to walk '’away" from human society. 
Rather the act of disconnecting oneself from the social unit 
to which one has been related through mutual concern and iden­
tification is simultaneously an entry into the social world 
which can be perceived as a whole only to the extent that it 
can be recognized as a particular collection of individuals. 
With the ideology of separate and generally opposed inter­
ests predominate and the fear of being maneuvered into an 
unprofitable sacrifice of one's own resources pervasive, the 
individual faces himself as a being who exists in a crowded 
but fundamentally isolated condition. If it were possible 
for him to ignore the inescapable physical proximity of other 
human beings the individual would at least be pursuing his 
personal interest in a logically defensible manner. But as 
the conceptual and practical dismembering of human effort 
continues, and his focus on the particular concerns of his 
own abilities and wants intensifies, the occlusion of the 
meaning of his individual growth and activity must result.
In this sense the individual is either forced to insist that 
his endeavors are solely motivated by a private and incom­
municable inspiration towards objective "production" or to 
admit that he acts in a wholly impulsive fashion without ref­
erence to any kind of constant theme such as would justify 
each new attempt. The catchall explanation of an exclusive 
focus on selfish interests, viz. the logic of self-preservation
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extended beyond the facts of a brute animal existence, can 
be employed to give a rational veneer to the dictum of 
modern competition at the individual level but it is increas­
ingly unable to account for the decidedly nonpreserving 
attack individuals make upon their own physical and mental 
being. Instead the vacuum produced by the devaluation of 
purpose and meaning with respect to human endeavor as a self- 
initiated and self-directed and ultimately self^expressive 
project is filled by the purpose of a system which operates 
not in human qua human-as-^universal interest but only in 
the interest of maintaining and expanding a particular locus 
of power and authority,
THE VIOLATED POTENTIAL: ISOLATION
INSTEAD OF INTEGRITY
Although the perversion of the family as a model of 
genuinely participatory social-political organization is a 
crucial violation of human rights and aspirations, the same 
process of alienation that effectively closes the individual 
to the real human potential for collective vision and effort 
reaches beyond the public dimension of one’s life. To the 
extent that individuality is not a given, i.e., that the 
human infant is recognized as an individual only insofar as 
the identity of his parents and family are brought to bear 
upon him by others and not by virtue of an active assertion 
of his own being, the essential human potential for a unique
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(personal) identity remains only a potential unless it is 
engaged by the dialectics of human interaction. Again, it 
is tempting to lean on a part of the (relatively) scien­
tific summation of the processes of human development by 
the modern sociologist who also perceives human being as 
the product of social life and interaction. But whereas 
the sociological understanding treats human exchange as 
the transmission of behavior and language necessary for a 
group to function, i.e., as the means by which the "me­
chanics” of the requisite socialization processes are ac­
complished, the concept of the dialectics on which human 
being depends has as its object the realization of human 
individuality. In this sense the interaction between in­
dividuals is the mediating activity between that which the 
individual is and that which he is not, manifested in a 
radically human context.
Not only by means of but because of the inevitably 
social character of human existence, paradigmatically illus­
trated by the family, human being can achieve a radically 
diverse independence. That independence is and will be com­
mensurate with the nature of universal value because its 
reality is beyond the influence of particular circumstance 
and yet only realized in spatial, temporal, i.e., fully con­
crete, terms. The essence of human individuality cannot be 
found in the separation of particular human being from its 
universal, i.e., from the concept of the constitutive
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features of human being, for the individuality of isolation 
is only by default. Cut adrift from the regulative princi­
ples of human being which can never be so eloquently ex­
pressed in abstraction as to substitute for the communica­
tion of beauty or justice or truth in objective human rela­
tionships (i.e., extra-personal or trans-personal), human 
individuality is only the shell of a profoundly accidental 
and consequently alien being. But to the extent that the 
individual subjectively gathers the universality of human 
being into the substance of his particular being and yet 
exercises the freedom of that particular material being to 
act (in the manner of Kant's autonomous man) in accord with 
his own "legislation" he is not a separate human being made 
"individual" by an irresolvable antagonism towards others, 
but is rather an individual human being whose separateness 
is the result of his being with others.
This is not the separateness of a particular being 
who must withhold himself from the interdependent relations 
of the group in order to guarantee his freedom to think 
differently and perhaps disagree, but rather the separate­
ness which is an ontologically constitutive feature of the 
human experience. The point is not to suggest that the 
physical discreteness of our bodies may be transcended by 
being ignored but rather to illuminate the significance of 
the physical limits of ourselves insofar as they both sug­
gest separate identity and demarcate what should be the
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difference. But the discrete character of our physical being 
can no more compel genuine individuality than it can defend 
the rights and freedoms on which individuality depends, for 
in the wake of the processes of social homogenization and 
control our physical separateness is only a fragile symbol 
of what ought to be the strength and independence of every 
human perspective.
The concrete realization of the ontologically human 
expression of essential individuality occurs only insofar 
as the generality of human being with which every particular 
being is born is overcome. True human difference is a func­
tion of the social character of human development for it can 
only issue from the experience of human commonality, i.e., 
the development of the self in human terms. In the same way 
that the humanization (the human development) of the senses 
depends upon the exposure of what are initially only the gen­
eral capacities of perception, taste, sight, sound, and cog­
nition, etc., to their appropriate objects as those objects 
reflect historical human being, the development of individ­
uality depends upon the interaction with other human individ­
uals who embody human history. It is this confrontation which 
defines the difference between the self which grows but never 
ceases to be itself and all other human being which, while 
infinitely particular in its appearance, forms a totality as 
the substance of continuing dialectical relationships to the 
individual.
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CONCLUSION
Lacking a foundation of values and principles which 
recognize in all other human being not only the source but 
the guarantee of human life as the unfolding of difference, 
personal distinction mutates into the attempt to dominate. 
When the concept of qualitative individuality, of the unique 
expression of universal human being, is repressed the uni­
versally human yearning for individuality can be seen to 
attempt to command a recognition of the self through the ex­
clusion of others. Clearly the occlusion of universal human 
value, truth, beauty, justice, etc., spawns an ignorance of 
human worth which threatens all individuality by suggesting 
that the only possible transcendence of human generality is 
the egotism of crude survival and conquest. In the same 
vein, the persistent fear of actualizing the universality of 
human being, as manifested in the failure of families and the 
preoccupation with personal freedom, has already resulted in 
a mass mockery of what is in truth the most precious and most 
difficult of human achievements. But this mockery pales in 
significance beside the alternatives to a genuine individ­
uality: The eclipse of the concept of individuality as an
active process and the concrete completion of its reifica­
tion, the fully particularized individual.
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